Tabassum Sadiq, Advocate for appellant.

Respondents Ex-parte.

JUDGMENT

       RAZA ALI KHAN, J.—The titled appeal, by leave of the Court, has arisen out of the judgment of the High Court dated 22.09.2022, whereby, the writ petition filed by the appellant herein, has been dismissed.

2.    The gist of the facts is that the appellant, herein, filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against respondent No. 2, herein, before the Judge Family Court, Mirpur, on 22.02.2019, which was objected to by respondent No.2, herein, by filing written statement on 19.03.2019. During the pendency of the suit, the appellant moved an application for producing additional list of witnesses on 11.05.2019. The learned Judge Family Court, Mirpur, after obtaining objections from the other side and hearing the parties, rejected the application vide order dated 08.07.2019. Feeling dissatisfied, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court against the said order dated 08.07.2019. The learned High Court after necessary proceedings, has also dismissed the writ petition through the impugned judgment dated 22.08.2022.

3.    Mr. Tabassum Sadiq, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant stated that the impugned judgment of the High Court is against law, the facts and the record of the case. He submitted that the appellant wants to produce his real mother as additional witness which is necessary for just decision of the case. He further submitted that that the Court is vested with the power to call any witness at any stage in the matrimonial matters and no express restriction has been imposed by the Family Courts Act, 1993, that a party cannot adduce additional evidence, but the Courts below while delivering the impugned judgments have totally ignored this important point. He further submitted that the observation of the Family Court in the impugned judgment that the said application for producing additional evidence had been filed after getting recorded evidence of two witnesses, whereas, fact of the matter is that the appellant filed the said application soon after filing of written statement by respondent No.2 i.e., on 11.05.2019. The learned Advocate contended that there is no provision in the entire Family Court law which restricts the appellant to produce additional evidence, therefore, the learned Family Court has wrongly rejected the application of the appellant. This important factor has also not been taken into consideration by the High Court, hence, the impugned judgments are not maintainable.

4.    We have heard the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant and perused the record made available. It divulges from the record that during the pendency of suit before the trial Court, appellant, herein, moved an application for producing additional evidence. The learned trial Court after hearing the parties, rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause has been shown for producing the additional evidence. The said order of the Family Court was challenged before the High Court by way of writ petition but the same also merit dismissal on the account that the writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised against the interlocutory order of the Family Court.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant has taken a categoric stance that the Family Court is vested with the power to call any witnesses at any stage of the trial. We have no cavil with this contention, however, the statutory provision dealing with the matter is quite different as to the contention of the learned Advocate. The relevant statutory provision has been provided in section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1993. Section 7(2) of the Act, 1993, is reproduced hereunder for better appreciation:–

“(2) The plaint shall contain all [material] facts relating to the dispute and shall contain a schedule giving the number of witnesses intended to be produced in support of the plaint, the names and addresses of the witnesses and brief summary of the facts to which they would depose:

Provided that the parties may, with the permission of the Court, call any witness at any later stage, if the Court considers such evidence expedient in the interest of justice.”

The perusal of the statutory provision (supra) reveals that the parties may call any witness at any later stage but that is subject to the permission of Court. It is the sole discretion of the Court to permit for producing any additional witness, if the Court finds that this is necessary for the interest of justice. In the provision, the term ‘expedient’ has been used. “Expedient” means that which is suitable and appropriate under the circumstances and which will serve the interests of justice. In a legal context, expedient is often used to refer to a course of action that is deemed to be necessary or appropriate, typically in order to expedite a particular legal process or to achieve a desired outcome. In order to call a witness at a later stage of the proceedings, the parties must approach the Court and seek permission. The Court will then evaluate the request and decide whether allowing the witness to testify would be beneficial in the interest of justice. The Court can also call witnesses, even if the parties have not requested it, if it deems it necessary. However, the parties may object to the Court’s decision and make their case against allowing the witness to testify. In any case, the Court must ensure that all reasonable steps are taken to ensure that justice is served and that all relevant evidence is examined. Allowing the parties to call a witness at a later stage of the proceedings is one way the Court can do this. In any case, the Court is the ultimate authority to decide whether to allow the calling of a witness at a later stage of the proceedings and whether to accept the evidence of such a witness, or not. In the case in hand, the learned Counsel for the appellant has not mentioned anything that why the producing of said witness is expedient in the interest of justice, nor any explanation has been furnished that why the said witness was not included in the list of witnesses already filed before the Court. In such state of affairs, the learned trial Court rightly dismissed the application of the appellant.

6. It is also observed that the suit was filed on 22.02.2019. According to section 12(2) of Family Courts Act, 1993, the Family Court has to decide the case within a period of four months from the date of institution of the presentation of the plaint, whereas, the case has still not been decided despite the lapse of almost three years, therefore, the learned Family Court is directed to decide the matter pending before it, without any delay and not later than-one month.

In view of the above this appeal, having no legal substance in it, is hereby dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.