Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)
8. Recovery of specific immoveable property.– A person entitled to the possession of specific immoveable property may recover it in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
— Necessity of seeking declaratory relief, possession, and injunction in title disputes — Scope — If the plaintiff is in possession but his title to the property is disputed or clouded, or if the defendant claims title and poses a threat of dispossession, the plaintiff must sue for a declaration of title and seek injunctive relief — Likewise, if the plaintiff’s title is clouded or disputed, and he is not in possession or not able to establish possession, he must file suit for a declaration, possession, and injunction. [2025 SCLR 4 =2025 SCMR 34 = 2024 SCP 375]
— Suit for possession — Scope — Where the plaintiffs filed a suit for possession against the defendants but failed to establish their title, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs must succeed solely on the strength and validity of their own title rather than relying on any deficiencies in the defendants’ situation — The Court further observed that the trial court was precluded from examining the validity of the defendants’ title, as the plaintiffs had not formally challenged it — Affirming the trial court’s approach, the Supreme Court concluded that its method of addressing the issue, along with its findings unfavorable to the plaintiffs, was correct. [2025 SCLR 4 =2025 SCMR 34 = 2024 SCP 375]
12. Cases in which specific performance enforceable.– Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the specific performance of any contract may in the discretion of the Court be enforced–
(a) when the act agreed to be done is in the performance, wholly or partly, of a trust;
(b) when there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused by non-performance of the act agreed to be done;
(c) when the act agreed to be done is such that pecuniary compensation for its non-performance would not afford adequate relief; or
(d) when it is probable that pecuniary compensation cannot be got for the non-performance of the act agreed to be done.
Explanation.– Unless and until the contrary is proved, the Court shall presume that the breach of a contract to transfer immoveable property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money, and that the breach of a contract to transfer moveable property can be thus relieved.
Illustrations
of clause (b)–
A agrees to buy, and B agrees to sell, a picture by a dead painter and two rare China vases. A may compel B specifically to perform this contract, for there is no standard for ascertaining the actual damage which would be caused by its non-performance.
of clause (c)–
A contracts with B to sell him a house for Rs.1,000. B is entitled to a decree directing A to convey the house to him, he paying the purchase-money. In consideration of being released from certain obligations imposed on it by its act of incorporation, a railway-company contracts with Z to make an archway through their railway to connect lands of Z severed by the railway, to construct a road between certain specified points, to pay a certain annual sum towards the maintenance of this road, and also to construct a siding and a wharf as specified in the contract. Z is entitled to have this contract specifically enforced, for his interest in its performance cannot be adequately compensated for by money: and the Court may appoint a proper person to superintend the construction of the archway, road, siding and wharf. A contracts to sell, and B contracts to buy, a certain number of railway-shares of a particular description. A refuses to complete the sale. B may compel A specifically to perform this agreement, for the shares are limited in number and not always to be had in the market, and their possession carries with it the status of a share-holder, which cannot otherwise be procured. A contracts with B to paint a picture for B, who agrees to pay therefor Rs.1,000. The picture is painted. B is entitled to have it delivered to him on payment or tender of the Rs.1,000.
of clause (d)–
A transfers without endorsement, but for valuable consideration, a promissory note to B. A becomes insolvent, and C is appointed his assignee. B may compel C to endorse the note, for C has succeeded to A’s liabilities, and a decree for pecuniary compensation for not endorsing the note would be fruitless.
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— Ss. 12 & 22 — Suit for specific performance — Discretionary jurisdiction — Scope — In a suit for specific performance grant of decree is a discretionary relief with the court — If the court comes to the conclusion that in grant of a decree equity leans in favour of the plaintiff then decree can be granted, otherwise, it is discretion of the court, even if the plaintiff has proved the agreement to sell even then it is discretion with the court to grant a decree or refuse thereof. [2025 SCLR 9 = 2025 SCMR 64 = 2024 SCP 345]
— Suit for specific performance — Deposit of sale consideration in court — Scope — Where the vendor refuses to accept the sale consideration amount, the vendee seeking a specific performance of the agreement to sell is essentially required to deposit the amount in the Court — The vendee has to demonstrate that he has been at all relevant times ready and willing to pay the amount and to show the availability of the amount with him — A vendee cannot seek enforcement of reciprocal obligation of the vendor unless he is able to demonstrate that not only his willingness but also his capability to fulfill his obligations under the contract. [2024 SCLR 31 = 2024 SCMR 168 = 2023 SCP 378]
— Agreement to sell — Scope — Dispute centered around the sale of land, with respondent claiming to have acquired the property from predecessor in interest of petitioner through an agreement to sell — Possession was taken after payment, and the predecessor had assured the transfer of the land upon his return from hajj — Unfortunately, he passed away before fulfilling this commitment — Material witnesses, including attesting witnesses and the son of the agreement’s scribe, had testified in favor of respondent during the proceedings, corroborating the sale transaction’s details — Cross-examination failed to cast doubt on the veracity of their evidence — Importantly, all legal heirs of the predecessor except petitioner had affirmed the sale transaction without contestation — The petitioner, representing the deceased’s interests, had not challenged the agreement before any forum and had failed to discharge the onus of proving its non-existence — The trial court, appellate court, and the High Court had all reached consistent and reasoned conclusions, finding no legal or factual irregularities — Supreme Court, concurring with these findings, emphasized the absence of any grounds for interference — Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and leave was declined. [2023 SCLR 73 = 2023 SCMR 2162 = 2023 SCP 317]
22. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance.– The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal.
The following are cases in which the Court may properly exercise a discretion not to decree specific performance:-
I. Where the circumstances under which the contract is made are such as to give the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant, though there may be no fraud or misrepresentation on the plaintiff’s part.
Illustrations
(a) A, a tenant for life of certain property, assigns his interest therein to B. C contracts to buy, and B contracts to sell, that interest. Before the contract is completed, A receives a mortal injury from the effects of which he dies the day after the contract is executed. If B and C were equally ignorant or equally aware of the fact, B is entitled to specific performance of the contract. If B knew the fact, and C did not, specific performance of the contract should be refused to B.
(b) A contracts to sell to B the interest of C in certain stock-in-trade. It is stipulated that the sale shall stand good, even though it should turn out that C’s interest is worth nothing. In fact, the value of C’s interest depends on the result of certain partnership-accounts, on which he is heavily in debt to his partners. This indebtedness is known to A, but not to B. Specific performance of the contract should be refused to A.
(c) A contracts to sell, and B contracts to buy, certain land. To protect the land from floods, it is necessary for its owner to maintain an expensive embankment. B does not know of this circumstance, and A conceals it from him. Specific performance of the contract should be refused to A.
(d) A’s property is put up to auction. B requests C, A’s attorney, to bid for him. C does this inadvertently and in good faith. The persons present, seeing the vendor’s attorney bidding, think that he is a mere puffer and cease to compete. The lot is knocked down to B at a low price. Specific performance of the contract should be refused to B.
II. Where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff.
Illustrations
(f) A and B, trustees, join their beneficiary, C, in a contract to sell the trust-estate to D, and personally agree to exonerate the estate from heavy encumbrances to which it is subject. The purchase-money is not nearly enough to discharge those encumbrances, though, at the date of the contract, the vendors believed it to be sufficient. Specific performance of the contract should be refused to D.
(g) A, the owner of an estate, contracts to sell it to B, and stipulates that he, A, shall not be obliged to define its boundary. The estate really comprises a valuable property, not known to either to be part of it. Specific performance of the contract should be refused to B unless he waives his claim to the unknown property.
(h) A contracts with B to sell him certain land, and to make a road to it from a certain railway-station. It is found afterwards that A cannot make the road without exposing himself to litigation. Specific performance of the part of the contract relating to the road should be refused to B, even though it may be held that he is entitled to specific performance of the rest with compensation for loss of the road.
(i) A, a lessee of mines, contracts with B, his lessor, that at any time during the continuance of the lease B may give notice of his desire to take the machinery and plant used in and about the mines, and that he shall have the articles specified in his notice delivered to him at a valuation on the expiry of the lease. Such a contract might be most injurious to the leasee’s business, and specific performance of it should be refused to B.
(j) A contracts to buy certain land from B. The contract is silent as to access to the land. No right of way to it can be shown to exist. Specific performance of the contract should be refused to B.
(k) A contracts with B to buy from B’s manufactory and not elsewhere all the goods of a certain class used by A in his trade. The Court cannot compel B to supply the goods, but if he does not supply them, A may be ruined unless he is allowed to buy them elsewhere. Specific performance of the contract should be refused to B.
The following is a case in which the Court may properly exercise a discretion to decree specific performance:-
III. Where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance.
Illustration
A sells land to a railway-company, who contracts to execute certain works for his convenience. The company takes the land and use it for their railway. Specific performance of the contract to execute the works should be decreed in favour of A.
— Ss. 12 & 22 — Suit for specific performance — Discretionary jurisdiction — Scope — In a suit for specific performance grant of decree is a discretionary relief with the court — If the court comes to the conclusion that in grant of a decree equity leans in favour of the plaintiff then decree can be granted, otherwise, it is discretion of the court, even if the plaintiff has proved the agreement to sell even then it is discretion with the court to grant a decree or refuse thereof. [2025 SCLR 9 = 2025 SCMR 64 = 2024 SCP 345]
— Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title — Scope — In cases involving protection under section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 the subsequent vendee who asserts that he is a bona fide purchaser i.e. a transferee for value has to discharge the initial onus — The latter has to discharge the initial onus to the effect that; he had acquired the property for due consideration and thus is a transferee for value; he has to show that the sale was for a price paid to the vendor and not otherwise; there was no dishonesty of purpose or tainted intention to enter into the transaction thereby meaning that the latter had acted in good faith or bona fidely and, lastly, that he had taken reasonable care to inquire i.e. (he) had acted as a person of ordinary prudence in making inquiries expected of a purchaser who intends to acquire a good title for the value being paid for. [PLR 2025 SC 4 = PLD 2025 SC 31 = 2024 SCP 367]
— Suit for cancellation of sale mutation — Proof of execution of document — Scope — Respondent (Plaintiff) challenged the authenticity of sale mutation to the extent of transfer of her share in property i.e. 18 Kanals — 02 Marlas on the ground that she neither sold the same to respondent (defendant) nor did she appear before any revenue official or impressed her thumb in this regard — Trial Court decreed the suit — Appellate Court, ultimately, dismissed the appeal — Validity — Being beneficiary, the petitioner was required to prove the execution of impugned mutation and in this background Ahle-Commission was examined and he in his cross-examination admitted that at the time of recording statement he had not mentioned that how much land was being sold by whom of the vendor — One of the vendors of suit mutation, appeared as defense witness and did not specifically refer the presence of respondent or receiving of amount by her — Similarly, marginal witnesses of the impugned mutation were examined as defense witnesses, and they neither verified their signature/thumb impression nor claimed to have signed/thumb impressed thereon — Hence, the proof of execution of impugned mutation, as required by the provisions of Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, was missing in the instant case — Revision petition was dismissed. [2024 CLS 22 = 2024 CLC 181]
— Suit for cancellation of sale mutation — Failure to prove offer and acceptance — Effect — Respondent (Plaintiff) challenged the authenticity of sale mutation to the extent of transfer of her share in property i.e. 18 Kanals — 02 Marlas on the ground that she neither sold the same to respondent (defendant) nor did she appear before any revenue official or impressed her thumb in this regard — Trial Court decreed the suit — Appellate Court, ultimately, dismissed the appeal — Validity — In the beginning the petitioner was required to plead and prove that an understanding was developed between parties about the sale and price of suit land prior to entry and attestation of the suit mutation; and without such understanding, it could not be believed that parties all of the sudden entered into bargain and recorded their statements — There was nothing on the entire case record that how, when, where and in whose presence the respondent expressed her intention to sale the land to petitioner and on what price which motivated the petitioner to get the suit mutation entered and to get a local commission appointed for recording statements of purported vendors — Hence the very foundation for a valid sale, which is offer by vendor and acceptance by the vendee, was missing in the instant case — Revision petition was dismissed. [2024 CLS 22 = 2024 CLC 181]
— Suit for declaration and cancellation — Mutation entry, a new cause of action — Scope — Defendant attacked the suit on the point of limitation claiming that the suit for cancellation of registered gift deed was filed after 20 years of its registration — Supreme Court observed that just before filing of the suit the defendant had got entered the mutation of gift in his name, on the basis of impugned gift in the government record which gave cause of action to the plaintiff — The stance of the plaintiff in this situation was correct and covered the point of limitation when gift deed was first time used against him which gave him the cause of action. [2024 SCLR 41 = 2024 SCMR 24]
— Suit for declaration and cancellation of documents — Burden of proof — Scope — The burden of proving sale and the mutation associated with the sale rests on the beneficiary — However, if he is unable to fulfill this obligation, it can be interpreted as an indication of fraudulent behavior. [2024 SCLR 32 = 2024 SCMR 178 = 2023 SCP 333]
54. Perpetual injunctions when granted.– Subject to the other provisions contained in, or referred to by, this Chapter, a perpetual injunction may be granted to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in favour of the applicant, whether expressly or by implication.
When such obligation arises from contract, the Court shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter II of this Act.
When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff’s right to, or enjoyment of, property, the Court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases (namely):-
(a) where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff;
(b) where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused, or likely to be caused, by the invasion;
(c) where the invasion is such that pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief;
(d) where it is probable that pecuniary compensation cannot be got for the invasion;
(e) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.
Explanation.– For the purpose of this section a trademark is property.
Illustrations
(a) A lets certain lands to B and B contracts not to dig sand or gravel thereout. A may sue for an injunction to restrain B from digging in violation of his contract.
(b) A trustee threatens a breach of trust. His co-trustees, if any, should, and the beneficial owners may, sue for an injunction to prevent the breach.
(c) The directors of a public company are about to pay a dividend out of capital or borrowed money. Any of the shareholders may sue for an injunction to restrain them.
(d) The directors of a fire and life-insurance company are about to engage in marine insurances. Any of the shareholders may sue for an injunction to restrain them.
(e) A, an executor, through misconduct or insolvency, is bringing the property of the deceased into danger. The Court may grant an injunction to restrain him from getting in the assets.
(f) A, a trustee for B, is about to make an imprudent sale of a small part of the trust-property. B may sue for an injunction to restrain the sale, even though compensation in money would have afforded him adequate relief.
(g) A makes a settlement (not founded on marriage or other valuable consideration) of an estate on B and his children. A then contracts to sell the estate to C. B or any of his children may sue for an injunction to restrain the sale.
(h) In the course of A’s employment as a vakil, certain papers belonging to his client, B, come into his possession. A threatens to make these papers public, or to communicate their contents to a stranger. B may sue for an injunction to restrain A from so doing.
(i) A is B’s medical adviser. He demands money of B which B declines to pay. A then threatens to make known the effect of B’s communications to him as a patient. This is contrary to A’s duty, and B may sue for an injunction to restrain him from so doing.
(j) A, the owner of two adjoining houses, lets one to B and afterwards lets the other to C. A and C begin to make such alterations in the house let to C as will prevent the comfortable enjoyment of the house let to B. B may sue for an injunction to restrain them from so doing.
(k) A lets certain arable lands to B for purposes of husbandry, but without any express contract as to the mode of cultivation. Contrary to the mode of cultivation customary in the district, B threatens to sow the lands with seed injurious thereto and requiring many years to eradicate. A may sue for an injunction to restrain B from sowing the lands in contravention of his implied contract to use them in a husband like manner.
(l) A, B and C are partners, the partnership being determinable at will. A threatens to do an act tending to the destruction of the partnership-property. B and C may, without seeking a dissolution of the partnership, sue for an injunction to restrain A from doing the act.
(m) A, a Hindu widow in possession of her deceased husband’s property, commits destruction of the property without any cause sufficient to justify her in so doing. The heir-expectant may sue for an injunction to restrain her.
(n) A, B and C are members of an undivided Hindu family. A cuts timber growing on the familyproperty, and threatens to destroy part of the family-house and to sell some of the family-utensils. B and C may sue for an injunction to restrain him.
(o) A, the owner of certain houses in Karachi, becomes insolvent B buys them from the Official Assignee and enters into possession. A persists in trespassing on and damaging the houses, and B is thereby compelled, at considerable expense, to employ men to protect the possession. B may sue for an injunction to restrain further acts of trespass.
(p) The inhabitants of a village claim a right of way over A’s land. In a suit against several of them, A obtains a declaratory decree that his land is subject to no such right. Afterwards each of the other villagers sues A for obstructing his alleged right of way over land. A may sue for an injunction to restrain them.
(q) A, in an administration-suit to which a creditor, B, is not a party, obtains a decree for the administration of C’s assets. B proceeds against C’s estate for his debt. A may sue for an injunction to restrain B.
(r) A and B are in possession of contiguous lands and of the mines underneath them. A works his mine so as to extend under B’s mines and threatens to remove certain pillars which help to support B’s mine. B may sue for an injunction to restrain him from so doing.
(s) A rings bells or makes some other unnecessary noise so near a house as to interfere materially and unreasonably with the physical comfort of the occupier, B. B may sue for an injunction restraining A from making the noise.
(t) A pollutes the air with smoke so as to interfere materially with the physical comfort of B and C, who carry on business in a neighbouring house. B and C may sue for an injunction to restrain the pollution.
(u) A infringes B’s patent. If the Court is satisfied that the patent is valid and has been infringed, B may obtain an injunction to restrain the infringement.
(v) A pirates B’s copyright. B may obtain an injunction to restrain the piracy, unless the work of which copyright is claimed is lebellous or obscene.
(w) A improperly uses the trademark of B. B may obtain an injunction to restrain the user, provided that B’s use of the trademark is honest.
(x) A, a trades man, holds out B as his partner against the wish and without the authority of B. B may sue for an injunction to restrain A from so doing.
(y) A, a very eminent man, writes letters on family-topics to B. After the death of A and B, C, who is B’s residuary legatee, proposes to make money by publishing A’s letters. D, who is A’s executor, has a property in the letters, and may sue for an injunction to restrain C from publishing them.
(z) A carries on a manufactory and B is his assistant. In the course of his business, A imparts to B a secret process of value. B afterwards demands money of A, threatening, in case of refusal, to disclose the process to C, a rival manufacturer. A may sue for an injunction to restrain B from disclosing the process.
— Necessity of seeking declaratory relief, possession, and injunction in title disputes — Scope — If the plaintiff is in possession but his title to the property is disputed or clouded, or if the defendant claims title and poses a threat of dispossession, the plaintiff must sue for a declaration of title and seek injunctive relief — Likewise, if the plaintiff’s title is clouded or disputed, and he is not in possession or not able to establish possession, he must file suit for a declaration, possession, and injunction. [2025 SCLR 4 =2025 SCMR 34 = 2024 SCP 375]
