2025 CCJ 9

Other citations: Original Judgment = 2025 PCrLJ 80

[Peshawar High Court]

Before Kamran Hayat Miankhel and Dr. Khurshid Iqbal, JJ

Shah Muhammad Khan—Petitioner

versus

The State and others—Respondents

Writ Petition Nos. 293-B, 364-B, 392-B, 402-B, 403-B, 406-B, 407-B, 451-B, 468-B, 470-B, 472-B, 484-B, 565-B, 634-B, 686-B, 754-B, 794-B, 798-B, 819-B of 2023, decided on 2^nd May, 2024.

HEADNOTES

Ahmad Farooq Khattak, Zahid Mehmood, Shahid Khan Bangash, Suleman Muhammad Khan (Ghaznavi), Masood Iqbal Khattak, Sultan Mehmood Khan and Noor Zada Khan Ahmadzai for the petitioners.

Najib Ullah, A.A.G. for respondents.

Zia-ud-Din, DPO, Aqiq Ullah, SP (Inv.), Bannu, Hamid Iqbal, ADC, Shamim Ullah, AAC-I, Karak, Amjad Hussain, DSP, Takht-e-Nasrati, Farooq Khan, DSP (Legal), Lal Zahir, Superintendent, H&TAs Deptt., Yasin Kamal, SHO Miryan, Zafar Khan ASHO, City, Bannu in attendance.

Date of hearing: 2^nd May, 2024.

JUDGMENT

Dr. Khusrhid Iqbal, J:—

1.           These 19 constitutional petitions were filed in June 2023. Their background is traceable to the 09 May 2023 political agitations by the members of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (TI), a political party whose leader Mr. Imran Khan, a former Prime Minister, was arrested in the premises of Islamabad High Court. The agitations flared up across the country creating serious law and order problem as attacks on public places, including military officers’ residences and offices, and damage to private property were widely reported. In an apparent crackdown, PTI workers were detained in different parts of the country, under 3 of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 (MPO). As a matter of course, the detention orders were challenged before this Court at its principal seat in Peshawar, and its Benches. This Bench heard a number of petitions, granted interim relief in some cases, and finally decided as many as 15 petitions by its common judgment passed on 13.06.2023. The petitions in hand were filed subsequently. The matter factually as well as legally being one and the same, we propose to decide them by this single opinion.

2.           Like in those decided earlier, the petitioners in these petitions hail from Bannu and Karak. Their detention (impugned) orders were issued by the Deputy Commissioners of their respective native districts. The crux, tone and tenor of each impugned detention order are the same which need not be spelt out separately. However, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the germane facts of one each from each district below:

              While detaining the petitioners concerned, the Deputy Commissioner, Bannu passed the following orders:

No.253/DC/AG-I/MPO    Dated 24.06.2023

[…]

Whereas, on the basis of information received from the District Police Officer, Bannu vide his office letter No.3417 dated 24.06.2023, wherein, it has been reported that the activities of the following individual is prejudicial to the public safety and maintenance of public order:

Whereas, it has been reported that the above-mentioned individual is involved in staging protests/process/rallies against the government and state on the basis of their political differences.

And whereas, on the basis of evidence/material placed before me, I am convinced to detain the above-mentioned individual, involved in the anti-state activities and their presence will pose grave threat to the public safety and is likely to cause breach of public peace and order.

[…]

       Similarly, the Deputy Commissioner, Karak, passed the following orders:

WHEREAS, it has been reported by the District Police Officer, Karak vide letter No. 1950/LB dated 10.05.2023 that Ex-MNA Shahid Khattak son of Mumtaz Khan resident of Khada Banda, Tehsil Takht-e-Nasrati, District Karak are detrimental to public peace and tranquillity. He has further reported that the said Shahid Khattak relates to PTI party and encouraging workers to protest against government for road blockage as well as creating perplexity in law and order to general public. He uses unhealthy language against all forces, agencies and administration. Thus, the activities of the above named person bent upon panic and lawlessness and spread treason against general public.

[…]

Endst: No.2225/DC/L&O/3-MPO           Dated 06.06.2023

3.           We heard arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned A.A.G., and gone through the record made available before us.

4.           At the very outset, it is worth noting that except the copies of the Notifications under Section 3 of the MPO, not even an lots of material was produced to substantiate the opinion formed by the Deputy Commissioners of the Districts concerned as to their satisfaction about the petitioners’ detention for maintenance of public order and safety

5.           The protection of liberty is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 9 of our Constitution. It provides that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law. Article 10 guarantees the rights of an individual to be informed of the reason for arrest and detention; to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his/her choice; and be produced before a magistrate within (instantaneously) a period of twenty-four hours when arrested. However, the above safeguards are not available in case of preventive detention. This is because the constitutional underpinning of preventive detention comes from sub-articles (3) to (8) of Article 10 which are exceptions to the safeguards as to arrest and detention as a fundamental right.

6.           The aforesaid sub-articles enunciate the subject matter a preventive detention law shall relate to, duration of detention and review of a detention order and the right of hearing as such review and the subject of the order (the persons whose preventive detention may be ordered). The MPO-the relevant statutory law-must be compliant with sub-articles (3) to (8) of Article 10. This constructs what we may call the first test: whether the preventive detention order is compliant to the aim and objective of the law authorizing it.

7.           A close reading of the language of Section 3 MPO shows that the Government [or a public authority authorized by the government) while passing a preventive detention order must be “satisfied”. In Abdul Baqi Baluch (1968)¹, one of the earliest cases, the Court ruled that a public functionary concerned is not under a duty to issue preventive detention order for reasonable ground(s). Being an executive power, “satisfaction” is subjective in nature. Of great importance, however, is the fact that subjective satisfaction is not unbridled. The test to be applied is that an incumbent public functionary must ensure that it has sufficient material before it while subjectively satisfying its judicious (though not judicial) conscience. From this, a second test that may be deduced is that the preventive detention order must be reasonable.

8.           While the MPO can’t be tagged as a law against political adversaries, yet one can’t lose sight of a perception that its Section 3 generally invoked against political adversaries by a government on the pretext of maintenance of public order and safety. In this perspective, Section 3 earns a criticism of its being weaponized against political dissent. The law of preventive detention is fluid in nature for two reasons: firstly, its application aims at curtailing liberty of an individual without any explicit and actionable criminal charge with a view to protect the society from the individual’s anticipated illegal or criminal activity. Secondly, it gives wide discretion to the executive authority of its being “satisfied” to order preventive detention. It always carries an apprehension of its use on the basis of mere suspicion. For this reason, it attracts scathing criticism in broader but diverse perspectives of criminal law, human rights, the rule of law, political pluralism, and good governance, which we will discuss later in this opinion. Under constitutional doctrine of checks and balance system, it is always amenable to judicial review by higher courts. In the succeeding lines, we proceed to discuss the cases.

9.           The significance of the right to liberty vis-à-vis preventive detention could be understood from the observation-“the presumption is that every imprisonment without trial is prima facie unlawful”-the Supreme Court spelt out in the Begum Shorish Kashmiri case². Such imprisonment, most notably, in the form of preventive detention without any lawful justification is subject to judicial review by a High Court.³ It is, however, worth noting that the judicial review power of a High Court is not that of appeal or revision. As was held in Shamas Din, the Court has to apply the test of reasonableness and objectivity.⁴ The Court has to see that “satisfaction” of the Government, as per Section 3 of the MPO, while forming an opinion about exercising its power of preventive detention, must be real, meaningful, reasonable and convincing. It follows that mere production of a detention order is not sufficient. The Court will be justified to compel an authority to produce before it the material which underpinned the order. The Court, in its review has to ensure that the authority did not pass an impugned order in unlawful manner.⁵ In Begum Shorish Kashmiri referred to above, the Supreme Court opined that a High Court has to see that the ground in an impugned order is relevant to the purpose of the law authorizing it and that it has been passed on the strength of some material before it and with a degree of reasonableness. In Liaqat Ali, it was held that the incompatibility of an impugned order with the objective of the law may lead one to infer that there were extraneous considerations and mala fide.⁶ The Court has to review the impugned order from the perspective of “without lawful authority” and “in lawful manner”, used in Article 199 (b) (1) of the Constitution. The former phrase is suggestive of the fact that an authority has no power under the law to pass such an order. The latter means that it is to be in accordance with law. In other words, these phrases respectively indicate that an impugned order shall not suffer with jurisdictional and procedural defects.

10.         We would now study the phrase “public order”, which has not been defined in the law. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon, a number of connotations of the phrase have been reproduced from various Indian cases. A few of them may be cited here for quick reference:

This is an expression of wide connotation and signifies the state of tranquillity prevailing among the members of political society as a result of the internal regulation of the Government.

The concept of “public order must be distinguished from the concept of “law and order” and “security of the State.” In some cases, the difference was illustrated by means of three imaginary concentric circles, the narrowest (sic) relating to security, the next to public order and the third and the larges to law and order. In other cases, the differentiation was based on the degree of the disorder although this test is unsatisfactory.

Public Order means even tempo of the life of the community taking within its fold even a specified locality and a substantial section of the society.⁷

11.         In the case of Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad, the Supreme Court has laid down certain tests with detailed explanation.⁸ In a recent case of Ameer Hussain, the Lahore High Court has summarized those test in the following words⁹:

(i) [T]he Court must be satisfied that the material before the detaining authority was such that a reasonable person would be satisfied as to the necessity for making the order of preventive detention;

(ii) [T]he satisfaction should be established with regard to each of the grounds of detention and if one of the grounds is shown to be bad, non-existent or irrelevant, the whole order of detention would be rendered invalid;

(iii) [T]he initial burden lies on the detaining authority to show the legality of the preventive detention;

(iv) [T]he detaining authority must place the whole material upon which the order of detention is based before the Court notwithstanding its claim of privilege with respect to any document, the validity of which claim shall be within the competence of the Court to decide.

(v) [T]he Court has further to be satisfied, in cases of preventive detention, that the order of detention was made by the authority prescribed in the law relating to preventive detention and that every requirements of the law relating to preventive detention had been strictly complied with;

(vi) [T]he ‘satisfaction’ in fact existed with regard to the necessity of preventive detention of the detenue;

(vii) [T]he edifice of satisfaction is to be built on the foundation of evidence because conjectural presumption cannot be equated with satisfaction; it is subjective assessment and there can be no objective satisfaction;

(viii) [T]he grounds of detention should not be vague and indefinite and should be comprehensive enough to enable the detenue to make representation against his detention to the authority, prescribed by law;

(ix) [T]he grounds of detention had been furnished within the period prescribed by law, and if no such period is prescribed, then ‘as soon as may be’.

12.         This Court has also been able to develop a good deal of jurisprudence on preventive detention. Besides, the case of Aftab Adam decided at the principal seat this month, a 2022 case of Noor Muhammad (WP # 864-M/2022 (Mingora bench) decided on 07 September 2022), may be referred.¹⁰ Other cases are: Anwar Ali, Humayun, Khanan, Khurram Shahzad, Asif Gohar and Rizwanullah.¹¹

13.         The right to liberty is a universally recognized human right. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (Article 9).¹² This protection is elaborated in Article 9 of the International Covenant Civil and Political Rights, 1976 (ICCPR).¹³ In its General Comment 29, the Human Rights Committee, established under the ICCPR, has even stated that the right to liberty is a rule of peremptory norm.¹⁴ Pakistan, as a party to the ICCPR, has binding (also called perfect) obligation to respect (the duty of the State to refrain from violation), to protect (duty of the State to prevent violation by third parties); and fulfil (duty of the State to formulate policy) human right for its citizens.

14.         It may also be heartening to discuss the matter from the perspective of Islamic law. In his famous work: Islamic Riyasat (Urdu), Syed AbulA’la Maududi has discussed the importance of fundamental rights vis-a-vis the role of the State in securing public interest. The securing following passages are relevant to our discussion.¹⁵

9۔بنیادی حقوق اور اجتماعی عدل

1۔ اللہ تم کو حکم دیتا ہے کہ امانتیں اہل امانت کے سپرد کرو اور جب لوگوں کے درمیان حکم (یا فیصلہ) کرو تو عدل کے ساتھ کرو۔ (النسا 58:4)

2۔اور کسی گروہ کی دشمنی تم کو انا مشتعل نہ کردے کہ تم عدل نہ کرو۔ عدل کرو، یہ تقویٰ سے قریب تر ہے۔ (المائدہ 5: 8)

یہ آیات اگر چہ وسیع ترین مفہوم میں مسلمانوں کو انفرادی و اجتماعی طور پر عدل کا پابند بناتی ہیں، مگر ظاہرہے کہ ان کے اس تقاضے سے اسلامی ریاست آزاد نہیں۔ لامحالہ اس کو بھی عدل ہی کا پابند ہونا چاہیے، بلکہ اسے تو بدرجہ اولیٰ ہونا چاہیے، کیونکہ حکم بین الناس کا سب سے زیادہ طاقتور ادارہ وہی ہے اور اگر اس کے حکم میں عدل نہ ہو تو پھر معاشرے میں اور کہیں عدل نہیں ہو سکتا۔

اب دیکھئے کہ جہاں تک ریاست کا تعلق ہے نبی اکرم صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم اور خلفائے راشدین کی سنت سے حکم بین الناس میں عدل برتنے کا کیا طریقہ ثابت ہوتا ہے۔

1۔ حجتہ الوداع کے مشہور خطبے میں نبی اکرم صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم نے اسلامی ریاست کے جن بنیادی اصولوں کا اعلان فرمایا تھا ان میں سےایک اہم اصول یہ بھی تھا:

یقیناً تمہاری جانیں اور تمہارے مال اور تمہاری آبروئیں ویسی ہی محترم ہیں جیسا آج حج کا یہ دن محترم ہے۔

اس اعلان میں مملکت اسلامیہ کے تمام شہریوں کو جان ، مال اور آبرو کی حرمت کا بنیادی حق عطا کیا گیا ہے جس کا بہر حال ہر اس ریاست کو التزام کرنا ہوگا جو اسلامی ریاست کے نام سے موسوم ہو۔

2۔ یہ حرمت کس حال میں کسی طرح ٹوٹ سکتی ہے؟ اس کا تعین نبی اکرم صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم ان الفاظ میں فرماتے ہیں:

(1) پھر جب لوگ یہ کام (یعنی شعادت توحید ورسالت اور اقامت صلوٰۃ وایتائے زکوٰة) کردیں تو وہ اپنی جانیں مجھ سے بچالیں گے الا یہ کہ اسلام کے کسی حق کی بنا پروہ مجرم ہوں اوران کی نیتوں کا حساب لینا اللہ کے ذمہ ہے۔ ( بخاری و مسلم)

(2) پس ان کی جان و مال ہم پر حرام ہیں الا یہ کہ جان و مال ہی کا کوئی حق ان پر قائم ہو، اور ان کے باطن کا حساب اللہ کے ذے ہے۔ ( بخاری و مسلم)

(3) مگر جو اسکا (یعنی کلمہ توحید) کا قائل ہو جائے اس نے مجھ سے اپنا مال اور اپنا فنس بچالیا الا یہ کہ اللہ کا کوئی حق اس پر قائم ہو، اور اس کے باطن کا حساب اللہ کے ذمے ہے۔ (بخاری)

یہ احادیث اس باب میں ناطق ہیں کہ اسلامی ریاست میں کسی شہری کی آزادی نفس اور حرمت جان و مال و آبرو پر کوئی دست درازی نہیں کی جاسکتی جب تک کہ اسلامیقانون کی رو سے اس پر (یا اس کے خلاف ) کوئی حق ثابت نہ کر دیا جائے۔

3۔ کسی پر (یا کسی کے خلاف) حق کا اثبات کس طرح ہو سکتا ہے ؟ اس کو نبی اکرم صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم یوں بیان فرماتے ہیں:

جب تیر ے سامنے دو فریق اپنا معاملہ لے کر بیٹھیں توان کافیصلہ نہ کر جب تک کہ دوسرے کی بات بھی نہ سن لے جس طرح پہلے کی سنی ہے۔ (ابوداؤد، تر مذی، احمد)

اور حضرت عمر رضی اللہ ایک مقدمے کے فیصلے میں تصریح کرتے ہیں:

اسلام میں کوئی شخص عدل کے بغیر قید نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔

اس مقدمے کی جو تفصیل موطا میں دی گئی ہے اس کو دیکھنے سے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ عراق کے نومفتوح علاقے میں جھوٹی چغلیاں کھا کھا کر لوگ دوسروں کو پکڑوا رہے تھے۔ اس کی شکایت جب حضرت عمر رضی اللہ کے پاس لائی گئی تو آپ نے اس کے فصلے میں یہ ارشاد فرمائے۔ اس سے صاف ظاہر ہوتا ہے کہ یہاں عدل سے مراد معروف عدالتی کاروائی اور اسے صفائی کا پورا موقع دیا جائے۔ اس کے بغیر اسلام میں کوئی شخص قید نہیں کیا جاسکتا۔

4۔ حضرت علی رضی اللہ کے زمانے میں جب خوارج کا ظہور ہوا، جو سرے سے ریاست ہی کو مانے کے لیے تیارنہ تھے، تو آپ نے انہیں لکھا کہ:

تم جہاں چاہو رہو۔ ہمارے اور تمہارے درمیان شرط یہ ہے کہ خون نہ بہاؤ اور بدامنی نہ پھیلاؤ اورکس پر ظلم نہ کرو۔ اور اگر ان کاموں میں سے کوئی کام تم نے کیا ت میں تمہارے خلاف جنگ کروں گا۔

یعنی خیالات تم جو چاہو رکھو۔ تمہارے خیال اور نیت پر گرفت نہ کی جائے گی ، البتہ اگر تم اپنے خیالات کے مطابق حکومت کا تختہ زبردستی الٹ دینے کی کوشش کرو گے تو یقیناً تمہارے خلاف کارروائی کی جائے گی۔ ان تصریحات کے بعد اس امر میں کوئی شک باقی نہیں رہتا کہ اسلامی تصور عدل کسی حال میں بھی انتظامہ کو یہ اختیار دینے کا روادار نہیں ہے کہ وہ معروف عدالتی کارروائی کے بغیر یوں ہی جس کو چاہیں پکڑیں، جسے چاہیں قید کر دیں ، جسے چاہیں خارج البدر کریں، جس کی چاہیں زبان بندی کریں اور جسے چاہیں اظہار رائے کے وسائل سے محروم کر دیں ۔ اس طرح کیا اختیارات جو ریاست اپنی انتظامیہ کو دیتی ہو، وہ اسلامی ریاست ہر گز نہیں ہو سکتی۔

اور ہی پھر حکم بین الناس میں عدل پر تنے کا ایک دوسرا مفہوم بھی ہم کو اسلام کی مستند روایات سے معلوم ہوتا ہے اور وہ یہ ہے کہ اسلام میں صدر ریاست اور گورنروں اور اعلیٰ حکام اور عامۃ الناس، سب کے لیے ایک ہی قانون اور ایک ہی نظام عدالت ہے۔ کسی کے لیے کوئی قانونی امتیاز نہیں ہے، کسی کے لیے خاص عدالتیں نہیں ہیں اور کوئی قانون کی پکڑ سے مستثنیٰ نہیں ہے۔ نبی اکرم صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم نے آخر وقت میں خود اپنے آپ کو پیش کیا کہ جس کو میرے خلاف کوئی دعویٰ ہو وہ لائے اور اپنا حق وصول کرے۔ حضرت عمر رضی اللہ نے ایک والی ریاست جبلہ بن ایہم غسانی سے ایک بدوی کو قصاص دلوایا ۔ حضرت عمر رضی اللہ بن العاص نے گورنروں کے لیے قانونی تحفظ کا مطالبہ کیا تو حضرت عمر رضی اللہ نے اسے ماننے سے صاف انکار کردیا اور عام لوگوں کو یہ حق دیا کہ جس حاکم کے خلاف انہیں شکایت ہو اسے کھلی عدالت میں لائیں۔

15.         While the above passage is self-explanatory, the point relevant to our discussion as gleaned from it is that the government of an Islamic State must act responsibly and couldn’t be allowed to abridge an individual’s rights to life, property and freedom and liberty. On balarice, however, an Islamic State has the right (power) to enact legislation and policies in the domain of criminal law (ta`zir only) to secure public interest (maslahah) provided they do not blatantly go against the principles of Shar’iyah. This is called Siyasah Sihar’iyah or the policies of Islamic Government. The meaning and scope of the doctrine of Siyasah may be understood from the following views of Muhammad Hashim Kamali, a Professor of Islamic law:

[I]n the usage of the fuqaha, Siyasah Shar’iyah implies decisions and policy measures taken by the imam and the ‘ulu al amr’ on matters for which no specific ruling could be found in the Shari’ah. In this sense, Siyasah Shar’iyah, as Khallaf observes, is tantamount to acting on maslahah or public interest which the Lawgiver has neither upheld nor overruled. Siyasah Shar’iyah, in other words, “denotes administration of public affairs in an Islamic polity with the aim of realizing the interests of, and preventing harm to, the community in harmony with the general principles of the Shari’ah even if it disagrees with the particular rulings of the mujtahidun.” Siyasah, in this sense, may entail adopting policies and enacting laws in all spheres of government, be it in the area of domestic or foreign relations, constitutional, fiscal, administrative or judicial affairs. All measures taken to ensure an efficient management of public affairs fall within the purview of Siyasah Shar’iyah. The only restriction in all this is that Siyasah Shar’iyah must not contravene the Shari’ah itself.¹⁶

16.         It follows from the above that while an Islamic State has the power what may be called the Siyasah power to enact a law, such as, one on preventive detention, such power shall not be used as a tool for derogation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Shar’iyah. This brings us to hold that while enforcing a preventive detention law, a government has to act with great care and sense of responsibility. In other words, the government has not only to acknowledge but honour the limits the laws impose on it.

17.         Limited government is one of the key factors of the rule law. Legal limits on government’s power play an instrumental role in promoting the rule of law. Such limits, however, tend to stand relegated into narrow scope (also called formal or thin conception) when understood in relation to diverse political goals, such as, human rights, democracy and development (also dubbed as thick conception of the rule of law). The former is concerned with the manner in which the laws are introduced; their content specified and given prospective effect. The latter take a broader view of the rule of law, addressing whether the law is just and good or unjust or bad. The earlier formulations of the former conception were offered rather proverbially, for example, “wherever law ends, tyranny begins”, as stated by John Lock, or “[i]n America the law is the king”, as pronounced by Thomas Paine.¹⁷ In the contemporary context, the United Nations has elaborated it in the following words:

The rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all, persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.¹⁸

18.         The World Justice Project (WIP) offers a joint definition of both conceptions as under:

[A] rules-based system in which the following four universal principles are upheld: (1) the government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law; (2) the laws are clear. publicized, stable, and fair, and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property; (3) the process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient; and (4) access to justice is provided by competent, independent, and ethical adjudicators. attorneys or representatives, and judicial officers who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.¹⁹

19.  The WJP has developed a Rule of Law Index comprising of the following nine basic concepts:

[L]imited government powers; absence of corruption; order and security; fundamental rights; open government; effective regulatory enforcement; access to civil justice; effective criminal justice; and informal justice […].²⁰

20.         Limited government power (thin conception), the factor most relevant to our discussion, means that the ruler is subject to legal restraints by means of constitutional and institutional checks and balances. If follows that the government’s officials and agents understand that their power is limited and that they are accountable under the law on the doctrine of judicial review.²¹ It further follows that when the limit is not observed, the judiciary has to step in to discharge its rule of law obligation.

21.         While discussing the role of judges in ensuring the rule of law in the UK within the context of the UK’s Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, Lord Bingham observed:

But the statutory affirmation of the rule of law as an existing constitutional principle and of the Lord Chancellor’s existing role in relation to it does have an important consequence: that the judges, in their role as journeymen judgment-makers, are not free to dismiss the rule of law as meaningless verbiage, the jurisprudential equivalent of motherhood and apple pie, even if they were inclined to do so. They would be bound to construe a statute so that it did not infringe an existing constitutional principle, if it were reasonably possible to do so.²²

22.         Commentators of the rule of law also argue it is a must for political officials to observe limits on their political conduct for survival of democracy. Given the political context of these petitions, it is worth observing that a constitutional democracy works on the basis of relationship between a representative government and the citizenry. Such a government should be mindful of the fact that “a necessary condition for a citizen to support [it,] is that [it does] not transgress [the citizens’] fundamental rights.”²³

23.         We would now revert to the cases in hand. The relevant portion of the impugned detention orders of the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu, already reproduced above, is that on the basis of what he called “evidence/material” before him, he felt “convinced” that the petitioner(s) were involved in anti-state activities and his/their presence will pose grave threat to the public safety and is likely to cause breach of public peace and public order. It is astonishing to note that the Deputy Commissioner of Karak, upon just receiving a letter from the District Police Officer, felt convinced to issue the detention orders without applying his own mind to the material placed before him to form an opinion as to whether the circumstances may warrant the issuance of such orders or not. We have already discussed above that while the government or its functionaries it has authorized may issue an order of preventive detention against an individual; the order must pass certain tests. In not a single case, any evidence/material worth the name was produced during the hearing. It follows that the respondents had no material before them to form a subjective opinion in support of the impugned orders. It means that the impugned orders fail to qualify the tests as aforesaid. There was no material before the respondents; no question arises as to satisfaction of each ground; the respondents failed to discharge their initial burden to show the legality of the impugned orders; the respondents failed to show any material let alone whole material upon which they passed the impugned orders; the respondents failed to satisfy this Court that they passed the impugned orders as prescribed in the law; they failed to show that the ‘satisfaction’ in fact existed; the impugned order being not based on evidence appear to be conjectural; the grounds of detention are vague and indefinite. The grounds of detention, however, were furnished promptly. In certain cases, no detention orders were issued at all. In others, a list containing the names of the petitioners was prepared, which is totally silent as to who prepared it, let alone providing an iota of evidence to warrant the issuance of detention orders against the petitioners.

24.         For the reasons articulated and the legal principles referred to above, we have reached to an irresistible conclusion that the impugned detention orders are not sustainable on facts as well as on law. These petitions, therefore, succeed. They are allowed. The impugned orders are set aside.

Petitions allowed