2025 CLS 24 = 2025 CLC 181 | Pakistan Kanoon

2025 CLS 24

Other citations: 2025 CLC 181

[Islamabad High Court]

Before Arbab Muhammad Tahir, J

Saeeda Jillani and others–Appellants

versus

Malik Sheraz Zafar and another—Respondents

F.A.O. No. 167 and Civil Revision No. 334 of 2019, decided on 7th August, 2024.

HEADNOTES

(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940) —

— S. 14 — Award to be signed and filed — Party’s right to file award — Scope — Under section 14(1), arbitrators or the umpire must sign the award and notify the parties — Under sub-section (2), they must file the award in Court upon request or Court direction, after payment of fees and costs, along with relevant documents, and the Court then notifies the parties of the filing — When arbitration proceedings culminate in an award, it cannot be enforced by itself unless filed in Court by the arbitrator or umpire in terms of section 14(2) — If the arbitrator or umpire, after pronouncing the award, is reluctant to file it in Court, only then can a party to the arbitration proceedings file it for enforcement — The scheme of section 14 does not obligate the arbitrator or umpire to provide the parties with signed copies of the award, but it also does not bar them from doing so — When a signed copy of the award is provided to a party, the arbitrator transfers the authority of filing the award in Court onto that party — An award grants the beneficiary the right to file an application under section 17 for recognition and enforcement through a decree — A careful perusal of section 14(2) indicates that only when the arbitrator is unwilling to provide copies of the award can a party apply under section 14(2) for a Court direction requiring the arbitrator to file the award — If a party files an award along with an application under section 14, it cannot be non-suited merely because the award was not filed by the arbitrator or umpire. [Para Nos. 26, 27, 28, 29 & 31]

Oil and Gas Development Company Limited v. Muhammad Nazir Khan (deceased) and others (2024 CLC 988) and Puppalla Ramulu v. Nagidi Apalaswami (AIR 1957 Andhra Paradesh 11) relied.

(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940) —

— S. 14 — Award to be signed and filed — Party’s right to file award — Scope — A person or a party must have a legitimate interest in the enforcement of an arbitration award — Typically, either party to the arbitration (the claimant or the respondent) has the equal right to seek the enforcement of an arbitral award, subject to law — Any party to the arbitration proceedings may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for the enforcement of an arbitration award, provided the applicable legal and procedural requirements are met. [Para No. 32]

— S. 30 — Grounds for setting aside award — Scope — While considering the validity of an arbitration award within the limbo of section 30, the court does no sit as a court of appeal and avoids reappraisal of the evidence — Since the parties resort to arbitration of their free will, hence an Award becomes final in relation to the facts as well as in law and interference therewith by the court hardly merits unless there exists patent illegality or specific grounds as enunciated in the Act. [Para No. 35]

Muhammad Wajid Hussain Mughal for appellants (in F.A.O. No. 167 of 2019).

Mansoor Ahmed for petitioner (in C.R. No. 334 of 2019).

Muhammad Ilyas Sheikh and Barrister Talha Ilyas Sheikh for Lerpondent No.1. (in C.R. No.334 of 2019 as well as F.A.O. No. 167 of 16100

Dates of hearing: 8th March, 11th December, 2023, 29th January, 20th February and 5th August, 2024.

JUDGMENT

Arbab Muhammad Tahir, J.—This single judgment shall dispose of the captioned Civil Revision Petition as well as the Appeal since the question of law involved in both the said cases is exactly the same and since the said cases are between the same parties and so also arise from one and the same judgment of the learned Court below.

2. Impugned in Civil Revision Petition No.334 of 2019 is the judgment and decree dated 31.05.2019 rendered by learned Senior Civil Judge-II, East-Islamabad, whereby the application filed by Malik Sheraz Zafar (respondent No.1 in both the cases) (to be referred to as “respondent No.1/Second Purchaser”) under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (to be referred to as “the Act”) was allowed, the Arbitration Award dated 10.06.2010 was made a rule of Court and a decree in terms thereof was passed. Furthermore, through the same very judgment and decree, the learned Senior Civil Judge had turned down the objections filed under Section 30 of the Act by Sheikh Muhammad Zulfiqar (petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition) (to be referred to as “petitioner/First Purchaser”) praying inter alia for setting aside of the said Award.

3. Whereas through F.A.O. No.167 of 2019, the appellants, Saeeda Jillani and Bilqees Begum (collectively to be referred to as “the allottees”) and Zafar Iqbal Rahat have questioned the validity of the very same judgment and decree dated 31.05.2019, whereby their objections filed under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act praying inter alia for setting aside of the said Award dated 10.06.2010, were also dismissed.

FACTS OF CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.334 OF 2019 AS WELL AS F.A.O. NO.167/2019.

4. In analyzing both the cases, it becomes apparent that their facts are intertwined, necessitating a comprehensive examination of each scenario concurrently. By juxtaposing the details of the Civil Revision Petition with those of the Appeal, a clearer understanding emerges of the interconnected nature of the events. Consequently, this discussion will proceed by delineating the relevant facts of each case in parallel, thereby facilitating a holistic evaluation of the overarching narrative.

5. The allottees and their sister namely Mrs. Jamila Begum (late) [predecessor in interest of appellant No.3 in F.A.O. No. 167 of 2019] owned land measuring around 129 kanals and 10 marlas situated in Mauza Kartal, Pakhral Chak Amdad Dhoke Sharaf, Tehsil and District Islamabad (to be referred to as “suit land”). The said land was acquired by Capital Development Authority (to be referred to as “CDA”) in the year 1969 and as per the terms of the CDA’s Rehabilitation Policy, the allottees were held entitled to an Agro Farm in Islamabad in lieu of the suit land.

6. Mst. Jamila Begum passed away on 05.05.1999, whereafter on 28.05.1999, an application was moved by appellant No.3 (Zafar Iqbal Rahat) on behalf of the remaining two allotees to the CDA for allotment of an Agro Plot. According to CDA Board’s decision dated 18.10.1999, the allottees were declared to be entitled for the allotment of an Agro Plot. Hence, vide letter No.CDA/E&M-II/PVC-40/80/99/08 dated 06.01.2000, an offer for allotment of Agro Plot No.80 comprising of 2.79 acres situated in Orchard Permanent Nursery Scheme, Murree Road, Islamabad (to be referred to as “suit plot”) was issued in favour of the allottees against payment of premium at the rate of 200/- per acre per annum. Furthermore, the allottees were called upon to deposit 25% of the total premium by 05.02.2000. It is asserted that appellant No.3, being the real son of Mst. Jamila Begum, sworn an affidavit to the effect that late Mst. Jamila Begum had no objection on the allotment of a plot in favour of the allottees.

7. Mst. Bilqees Begum [appellant No.2 in the appeal] along with late Mrs. Jamila Begum executed registered General Power of Attorney on 15.01.1995, whereas Saeeda Jillani [appellant No.1 in the appeal] executed such an Attorney on 18.01.1995, (to be collectively referred to as “GPAs”), in favour of Zafar Iqbal Rahat [appellant No.3 in the appeal] (to be referred to as “Attorney”) with respect to the entire rights of the suit land acquired by CDA.

FIRST AGREEMENT TO SELL:

8. In exercise of the authority vested in him through above-mentioned registered GPAs, the Attorney sold the rights of suit plot expected to be allotted to the donors of the GPAs to the petitioner/First Purchaser vide sale agreement dated 26.05.1999 for a total sale consideration of Rs. 16,00,000/- (Rupees Sixteen lacs only). An amount of Rs.50,000/- was paid by the petitioner/First Purchaser to the Attorney through cheque bearing No.10755325 dated 26.05.1999 drawn on Muslim Commercial Bank, Aabpara Branch, Islamabad whereas the remaining sale consideration of Rs. 15,50,000/- was agreed to be paid to the latter at the time of the transfer of plot in the name of the former and/or his nominee.

9. Since the allottees were not interested in Agro Plot No. 80, they filed Writ Petition No.215 of 2000 before the Hon’ble Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench titled as “Mst. Bilgees Begum v. CDA” praying inter alia for a direction to the CDA to allot any other available, proper and plain plot in exchange of Plot No.80. The said writ petition stood dismissed vide order dated 15.02.2005 with observation to approach the Court of plenary jurisdiction. Subsequently, on 20.08.2005, the allottees instituted a suit for declaration, mandatory and permanent injunction praying inter alia for a declaration to the effect that a decree be passed declaring them to be entitled for allotment of an alternative developed of equal size and value as the one already allotted viz Plot No. 80 on Murree Road, Islamabad. During pendency of the said suit, CDA offered allottees an alternate plot bearing No. 19 measuring 2.50 acres, Murree Road Islamabad vide offer letter dated 21.01.2010 against premium at the rate of 18,00,000/- per acre in addition to the Annual Ground Rent at the rate of Rs.4500/- per acre per annum. Upon withdrawal of said suit as well as on payment of 25% on account of the premium, the CDA issued another allotment letter in respect of Plot No. 19 on 23.01.2010. Later on 26.01.2010, the allottees instituted yet another suit on exactly the same grounds on the basis of mere apprehension qua cancellation of the newly allotted plot i.e. Plot No. 19. It ought to be mentioned that both the civil suits were instituted by the allottees through respondent No.1/Second Purchaser as their “Special Attorney”.

SECOND AGREEMENT TO SELL:

10. As mentioned above, the petitioner/First Purchaser having purchased the suit plot through agreement to sell dated 26.05.1999 from Attorney, further sold it to respondent No.1/Second Purchaser through agreement dated 30.07.2003 for a total sale consideration of Rs.85,00,000/- per the terms of the said agreement dated 30.07.2003, respondent No.1/Second Purchaser was obligated to pay Rs.23,00,000/- and/or any increase / decrease to the CDA. Furthermore, respondent No. 1/Second Purchaser paid 50% of the balance amount i.e. 31,00,000/- to the petitioner/First Purchaser in the following manner:-

i. 30,00,000/- paid through Pay Order No.0317486 dated 30.07.2003 drawn on Allied Bank Limited, G-8 Markaz Branch, Islamabad.

ii. Rs. 1,00,000/-in cash.

11. Whereas the remaining 50% i.e. 31,00,000/- was to be paid to the petitioner/First Purchaser within a period of three months from the date of signing/execution of said agreement dated 30.07.2003. Under the terms of the said agreement, the petitioner/First Purchaser was bound to get an agreement to the extent of 50% ownership of the plot executed between the allottees and respondent No. 1/Second Purchaser. It was also agreed upon that in case of failure, the petitioner/First Purchaser was also to return Rs.31,00,000/- to respondent No.1/Second Purchaser within 15 days.

12. Three days after the execution of agreement dated 30.07.2003 (i.e. the agreement between the petitioner/First Purchaser and respondent No.1/Second Purchaser), the allottees entered into an agreement to sell dated 02.08.2003, as “First Party” with the petitioner/First Purchaser and respondent No.1 /Second Purchaser as “Second Party”. The allottees sold their rights again with respect to the suit plot/alternate plot to the Second Party at a profit of Rs. 16,00,000/-. On the same day i.e. 02.08.2003, the allottees also executed a Special Power of Attorney in favour of the petitioner/ First Purchaser and respondent No.1 / Second Purchaser.

ARBITRATION:

13. After the execution of the aforementioned agreement, the disputes between the petitioner/First Purchaser and respondent No.1/Second Purchaser developed. As such the petitioner/First Purchaser appointed one Haji Muhammad Saleem as Arbitrator on his behalf whereas respondent No. 1/Second Purchaser appointed Muhammad Ashraf as Arbitrator on his behalf. Both the nominated Arbitrators could not arrive at a conclusive decision in relation to the referred disputes, as such the matter was referred to the Umpire/Referee, namely Qazi Rafi ud Din Babar, Advocate through Iqrar Nama dated 11.02.2010. It may be apposite to mention here that both the parties had given their consent that the decision of the Umpire would be acceptable to both the parties.

AWARD:

14. The Umpire after entering upon the reference, framed the issues, recorded the evidence of both parties and after fulfilling the required formalities, rendered his Award on 10.06.2010. Apparently, after announcement of the said Award, the Umpire through letter dated 10.06.2010 had informed the parties as to the pronouncement of the award. The said Award was made rule of Court vide judgment and decree dated 31.05.2019, hence the captioned Civil Revision Petition as well as the Appeal.

15. Mr. Muhammad Wajid Hussain Mughal, representing the appellants/allottees in the appeal contends that the allottees are the exclusive owners of the suit property. That respondent No.1/Second Purchaser in collusion with land grabbers, started construction on the suit plot belonging to the allottees. That on 26.05.1999, an agreement to sell was executed between appellants Nos. 1 and 2/allottees and petitioner/First Purchaser according to which, then he was obliged to clear the entire dues of the CDA in relation to the suit plot and also to make efforts for the allotment of Agro Plot against the claim of the allottees predecessor in interest. That since the petitioner/First Purchaser did not make any effort either for the allotment of the Agro Plot nor paid any dues pursuant to the terms of the said agreement, hence, the said agreement was revoked. That since the allottees had revoked the agreement to sell dated 26.05.1999, therefore, the petitioner/First Purchaser had no right to enter into any further sale agreement with any third party with respect to the suit plot. That the petitioner/First Purchaser and respondent No.1/Second Purchaser in league with each other, fraudulently entered into sale agreement dated 30.07.2003 with respect to the suit plot, which was the exclusive ownership of the alltottees. That the said agreement was neither signed by the allottees nor their Attorney i.e. appellant No.3. That after the disputes arose between petitioner/First Purchaser and respondent No.1/Second Purchaser regarding the alleged sale agreement dated 30.07.2003, the matter was referred to the so-called Umpire/Arbitrator, namely Qazi Rafi ud Din Babar, Advocate. That the allottees were neither parties to the said sale agreement dated 30.07.2003 nor to the arbitration proceedings hence, they had no concern with the so-called arbitration proceedings. That instead of filing an application under Section 14 of the Act, respondent No.1/Second Purchaser filed an application under Section 17 of the Act, wherein the allottees were impleaded as parties. That appellants filed their objections under Section 30 of the Act praying for setting aside of Award dated 10.06.2010. That the learned trial Court did not consider the appellants objections to the said Award.

16. He further emphasized that learned trial Court erred in law by tot appreciating that neither the Award was filed by the Umpire nor any authority was conferred upon respondent No.1/Second Purchaser to file the same in the Court. That since the original Award was not filed in the Court by the Umpire hence, the same could not have been made rule of the Court. That the objections of the appellants were turned down on mere technicality. That the impugned judgment dated 31.05.2019 is not sustainable in the eye of law. And that impugned judgment is the result of non-reading and mis-reading of the material available on record, concluded learned counsel for the appellants. In order to supplement his arguments, he placed reliance on the judgments reported as 2010 YLR 448, 2004 YLR 1882, 1999 CLC 1685, 2007 YLR 1608, 2003 YLR 1109, PLD 2017 Islamabad 1, 2008 CLC 1476, 2010 YLR 164, PLD 1990 Lahore 23, 1994 SCMR 603, 2010 YLR 1448 and PLD 1953 Sindh 18.

17. Mr. Mansoor Ahmed, representing the petitioner/First Purchaser, has argued that learned trial Court while ignoring patent illegality in respondent No. 1/Second Purchaser’s application filed under Section 17 of the Act, accepted the same. That one of the patent illegalities which was floating on the surface of record was that the original allottees were not arrayed as necessary parties in the arbitration proceedings. That, the said parties were subsequently impleaded by respondent No. 1/Second Purchaser in his application under Section 17 of the Act. That since the allottees were the exclusive owners of suit plot, thus they were the necessary parties to be impleaded in the arbitration proceedings. That the application filed by respondent No.1/Second Purchaser under Section 17 of the Act ought to have been rejected on the sole ground that original allottees were not parties in the arbitration proceedings. That on this score alone, the application filed by respondent No.1/Second Purchaser under Section 17 merited dismissal. That the impleadment of the said allottees in the arbitration proceeding rendered the very Award invalid and of no legal consequences. That the conclusion drawn by the Umpire/Referee that the sale agreement dated 30.07.2003 was executable is without any substance. That the Umpire/Referee also erred by not examining the effect of the subsequent agreement dated 02.08.2003. That the learned trial Court did not appreciate that the award rendered by the Umpire/Referee did not decide the disputes between the contesting parties. That the impugned judgment was passed without appreciating the material available on the record as well as the law on the subject. That the Court is bound to examine the validity and legality of an arbitration award before making the same as a rule of Court. That since the Award was not filed in the Court by Umpire rather by respondent No. 1/Second Purchaser on his own, therefore, the same was not enforceable, concluded learned counsel for the petitioner. During the course of his contentions, he placed reliance on the judgments reported as PLD 2016 SC 121, 2009 SCMR 29, 2014 SCMR 1268, 2018 SCMR 662, 2010 CLC 1014, 2010 YLR 1448, 2017 YLR 301, AIR 1963 AP 8, PLD 2016 SC 872, PLD 2003 Lahore 522 and PLD 1986 Quetta 321.

18. Whereas, Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Sheikh, learned counsel representing respondent No. 1 /Second Purchaser in both the cases, has vehemently controverted the contentions of learned counsel for appellants and petitioner/First Purchaser by contending that on the basis of the Power of Attorney, the petitioner/First Purchaser executed sale agreement dated 30.07.2003 with respondent No.1/Second Purchaser and thereby sold the suit plot to him. That said petitioner also got managed the execution of sale agreement dated 02.08.2003 between the allottees and respondent No.1/Second Purchaser. That respondent No.1/Second Purchaser was informed that the plot in question is free from all encumbrances. That respondent No. 1/Second Purchaser asked the petitioner/First Purchaser to fulfill his contractual obligations under the sale agreement executed between the parties. That it was mutually decided by the parties to get the issues resolved through arbitration. That was with consent of petitioner/First Purchaser that the matter was referred to the two Arbitral Tribunals appointed by each party and thereafter was referred to the Umpire/Referee. That the reference of dispute to arbitration was not objected to either by the allottees or by the petitioner/First Purchaser. That the Arbitrators appointed by each party as well as the petitioner/First Purchaser sworn affidavits to the effect that the decision to be rendered by the Umpire/Referee shall be binding upon he parties.

19. He further argued that all the codal formalities were fulfilled by the Arbitrators/Umpire. That had the Award rendered by the Umpire been to the likings of petitioner/First Purchaser, he could not have objected the same. That after the pronouncement of the Award, the petitioner/First Purchaser was required to implement the same, which was strictly in accordance with the law governing the subject. That neither the allottees nor the petitioner/First Purchaser challenged the Award dated 10.06.2010, which fact implies that the same was compliant in all respect. And that had the decree was not passed in terms of the said Award, the rights of respondent No.1/ Second Purchaser would have been jeopardized. And that the impugned judgment and decree is strictly in accordance with law and thus not open to any interference by this Court, concluded learned counsel for respondent No.1/Second Purchaser in both the cases.

20. Arguments heard. Record perused. The facts which led to the filing of the captioned Civil Revision Petition as well as Appeal have been substantially discussed in preceding paragraphs and thus need no replication.

21. This Court, in the first instance, deems it appropriate, to address the objections raised and emphasized by learned counsel for the petitioner/First Purchaser as well as learned counsel for the allottees to the effect that neither the Award dated 10-6-2010 was filed by the Arbitrator/Umpire nor any authority expressed or implied was vested in respondent No.1/Second Purchaser to file the same in the Court on his own.

22. In order to address the first question, several factors need to be considered. This court is of the view that a person or a party must have a legitimate interest in the enforcement of an arbitration award. Typically, either, party to the arbitration (the claimant or the respondent) has the equal right to seek the enforcement of an arbitral award, subject to law. Under the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (which has been adopted by many countries), any party to the arbitration proceedings may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for the enforcement of an arbitration award, provided the applicable legal and procedural requirements are met.

23. Before rendering an opinion on the said questions, it would be appropriate to reproduce Section 14(2) of the Act, which is the only provision prescribed for filing an award in the court of competent jurisdiction. The said section reads thus:-

“14. Award to be signed and filed.-(1) When the arbitrators or umpire have made their award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and award.

(2) The arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the Court and upon payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of filing the award, cause the award or signed copy of it, together with any depositions and documents which may have been, taken and proved before them, to be filed in Court, and the Court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the award.

24. In the case titled CDA and another v. Messrs Habib Rafiq (Pvt.) Ltd and others (2021 SCMR 1137), it was inter alia held by the august Supreme Court that:-

“There is no specific provision in the Arbitration Act, 1940 imposing a duty or prohibition upon the Arbitrator to file the Award in Court on his own. Arbitrator is mandated to file the Award in the court of plenary jurisdiction at the request of any party to the Arbitration or on the direction of the Court or caused the award to be filed in Court…

… once the Award is signed and made, and the parties are notified of the same, it is up to the parties or any person claiming under them to request the Arbitrator to file the Award in Court to be made rule of the court and pronounce judgment followed by a decree thereon…”

(Emphasis is supplied)

25. The august Supreme Court in the case titled Inayat Ullah Khan v. Obaidullah Khan and others (1999 SCMR 2702) held as under:-

“The arbitrators by themselves were not competent to file the award in Court as such filing of an award was not envisaged under section 14 of the Act because the arbitrators had neither been requested by any party to the arbitration agreement to file the award in Court nor had been so directed by the Court.”

(Emphasis is supplied)

26. Under Section 14 (1) ibid, it is clearly mentioned that when the arbitrators or the umpire have made their award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof, under subsection (2) of the said provision, it is further provided that the arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the Court and upon payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of filing the award, cause the award or a signed copy of it, together with any deposition and documents which may have been taken and proved before them, to be filed in Court, and the Court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the award.

27. In the lis at hand, the Umpire had rendered the Award on 10.06.2010 and a copy thereof was procured by respondent No. 1/Second Purchaser, who filed the same in the civil Court on 08.09.2010 with the request to recognize and enforce the same by passing a judgment and decree in terms thereof. There is no provision in the Act, which obligates the Arbitrator and/or the Umpire to necessarily file the award in the court of plenary jurisdiction. Furthermore, there is also no provision in the said Act, which precludes an Arbitrator and/or an Umpire to file the Award in the court suo motu. It is my view that when the arbitration proceedings culminate in an Award, such an Award cannot, by itself be enforced unless the same is filed in the Court by the Arbitrator/Umpire in terms of Section 14(2) ibid, and if the Arbitrator or the Umpire, after pronouncement of the Award, is reluctant to file the same in the Court only then it is the party to the arbitration proceedings, who can file the same in the Court in order to get it enforced.

28. From the scheme of Section 14 of the Act, it can be deduced that said Section does not in any manner obligate the Arbitrator/Umpire to provide the parties with signed copies of the award. But it also does not bar the Arbitrator/Umpire from providing signed copies of the award. When a signed copy of the award is provided to the party (as in the present case), the Arbitrator passes his authority of filing the Award in Court onto the party, which has been given a copy of the Award.

29. It goes without saying that an award gives the beneficiary the right to file an application under Section 17 of the Act so that the same is recognized and enforced by way of passing a decree in terms thereof. A careful perusal of Section 14(2) shows that in cases where the arbitrator is not willing to provide copies of the award to the parties concerned only then a party to the arbitration proceeding can file an application under Section 14(2) of the Act praying for direction by the Court to the arbitrator to file the award in the Court.

30. In the case titled “Puppalla Ramulu v. Nagidi Apalaswami” (AIR 1957 Andhra Paradesh 11), it was inter alia held that Section 14(2) of the Act comes into play only when the assistance of the Court is sought in order to get the Award filed in the Court by calling upon the Arbitrator/Umpire to do so. Further it was held that where, the Arbitrator/Umpire does not give notice in writing to the concerned parties of making and signing the award but also provides them with copies of the Award, then in such eventuality, there is no bar or restriction placed upon a party to the arbitration proceedings to file the Award in the Court of competent jurisdiction so as to get it enforced.

31. As mentioned above, an Arbitration Award cannot be left unenforced primarily on the ground that the same has not been filed by the Arbitrator/Umpire. It is my view that when an Arbitrator/Umpire provides the parties to the arbitration proceedings with copies of the Award so rendered by him, then it would be presumed that the Arbitrator/Umpire bestowed his authority of filing the Award in the Court onto such a party impliedly. There is however an exception to this rule which is that Court nevertheless can call upon an a Arbitrator/Umpire on its own motion or an application by any party under Section 14 of Act to cause the Award or a signed copy of it together with any deposition and documents to be filed in the Court. It would be apposite to mention that when an Award is filed by a party to the arbitration proceedings along with an application under Section 14 of the Act, such a party cannot be non-suited on the premise that the Award was not filed by the Arbitrator/Umpire.

32. This court is further of the view that a person or a party must have a legitimate interest in the enforcement of an arbitration award. Typically, either party to the arbitration (the claimant or the respondent) has the equal right to seek the enforcement of an arbitral award, subject to law. Under the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (which has been adopted by many countries), any party to the arbitration proceedings may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for the enforcement of an arbitration award, provided the applicable legal and procedural requirements are met.

33. This Court in an authoritative judgment rendered in the case titled “Oil and Gas Development Company Limited v. Muhammad Nazir Khan (deceased) and others” (2024 CLC 988) has dilated upon the concept of filing an Arbitration Award by a party. The relevant excerpts whereof are reproduced herein below:-

14. By dismissing the appellant’s application under Section 14 of the 1940 Act, the learned Civil Court appears to have proceeded on the assumption that unless an award is filed in the Court by the arbitrator, an application under Section 14 filed by a party in whose favour the award is rendered would not be competent. There is no legal basis for such a view given the mandate in Section 14(2). Under the scheme of the 1940 Act, an award itself cannot be enforced. The parties must obtain a stamp of approval of the Court by securing a decree in terms of the award. An award entitles the beneficiary to file an application under Section 17 of the 1940 Act for a decree to be passed in terms of the award so that such decree can be enforced. Before an application under Section 17 is filed, the award is to be filed in the Court. It is in cases where the arbitrator does not provide the parties with coples of the award that a party can file an application under Section 14(2) for seeking a direction of the Court to the arbitrator to file the award in the Court. In the case of Puppalla Ramulu Nagidi Appalaswami (AIR 1957 Andhra Paradesh 11), it has been held that Section 14(2) applies only to a case where tie help of the Court is sought for getting the award filed in the Court by calling upon the arbitrator to do so. Where however, the arbitrator does not give notice in waiting to the parties of making and signing the award but also provides them with copies of the award, there is no impediment before a paty in filing such an award before the Court in order to have it enforced. Where the arbitrator gives copies of the award to the parties, they would be deemed to have an implied authority of the arbitrator to file it in the Court. Even where the award is filed in the Court by a party, the Court can nevertheless require the arbitrator to cause the award or a signed copy of it together with any deposition and documents to be filed in the Court. Where the award is filed by a party along with an application under Section 14 of the 1940 Act, the Court cannot simply dismiss such an application on the ground that the award was not filed by the arbitrator. As mentioned above, where an award is filed by a party the Court, in order to satisfy itself that such award is indeed the award that was rendered by the arbitrator, can require the arbitrator to file the same in the Court. But without doing so it cannot dismiss the application under Section 14 of the 1940 Act as was done by the learned Civil Court in this case. By dismissing the appellant’s application under Section 14 of the 1940 Act without requiring the arbitrator to file the award in the Court, the learned Civil Court, in my view, committed a jurisdictional irregularity.

(Emphasis is supplied)

34. The law requires for an Arbitration Award to be filed in court pursuant to Section 14(2) of the Act, in order to procure the attendance of the concerned parties so as to enable such parties to file objections, if any to the Award. In the lis at hand, none of the appellants/allottees in the appeal or the petitioner/First Purchaser questioned the very existence of the Award dated 10.06.2010. In their objections, neither the allottees nor the petitioner/First Purchaser deny the factum as to the rendering of the Award by the Umpire on 10.06.2010. All that could be discerned from their objections is their assertions to the effect that the Award was made in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Act. It is my view that the civil court would have been well within its right to have called upon the Arbitrator/Umpire qua filing of the Award in the Court had the allottees and/or the petitioner/First Purchaser denied the very existence or authenticity of the said Award. All that the allottees and petitioner/First Purchaser object is that the same was not filed by the Arbitrator/Umpire. It is my view that had the Award been to their likings in other words, in their favour, they would not have raised a single objection to the same.

35. Even otherwise, it is settled law that while considering the validity of an arbitration award within the limbo of Section 30 of the Act, the court does no sit as a court of appeal and avoids reappraisal of the evidence. Since the parties resort to arbitration of their free will, hence an Award becomes final in relation to the facts as well as in law and interference therewith by the court hardly merited if there exists patent illegality or specific grounds as enunciated in the Act.

36. It is also well established that an award is exceptionable and could be interfered with only in cases where there surfaces an error on the, face of record not requiring scrutiny beyond the Award for discovering the same. The practice of interference by the courts in the Arbitration Award is also deprecated by the superior Courts of the country in order to avoid the concept that if on the basis of the available evidence on record, the court may have reached at a different conclusion.

37. Now turning to the other objection raised by learned counsel for the allottees/petitioner that, the said allottees were not arrayed as necessary parties in the arbitration proceedings. Needless to observe that the allottees had sold their ownership in the suit plot to the petitioner/First Purchaser as well as respondent No. 1/Second Purchaser. Thus they waived off their ownership in the suit plot. On the record there are (i) sale agreements dated 25.06.1999 and (ii) Special Power of Attorney dated 02.08.2003, the execution whereof has not been denied. Apparently, the Special Power of Attorney was coupled with interest and as such gained the protection in terms of Section 202 of the Contract Act, 1872 as such the same could not have been simply revoked by the said allottees. Since the dispute was only between the petitioner/First Purchaser and respondent No.1/Second Purchaser, they were the contesting parties to the arbitration proceedings.

38. This Court has gone through the reasoning given in the impugned judgment and decree dated 31.05.2019 with respect to the dismissal of the objections to the Award by the allottees and the petitioner/First Purchaser and have formed the view that the same were rightly rejected by the learned Court below since the objections were filed with substantial delay and beyond the statutory period of thirty days provided by law. Moreover, neither the allottees nor the petitioner/First Purchaser come up with any plausible ground with respect to the non-filing of an application for condonation of delay. It is well settled that the question of limitation needs to be strictly construed.

39. It may not be out of context to mention that Section 44(a) of the Act empowers a High Court to make rules in consonance with the provisions of said Act. In exercise of the power conferred by Section 44 ibid, the Rules called “Rules under the Arbitration Act, 1940” were framed by Hon’ble Lahore High Court. The said Rules were subsequently adopted mutatis mutandis by this Court. Rule 10(a) of the said Rules talks about filing of an Arbitration Award in the following manner:-

“(10)(a)… The arbitrator or umpire or any of the parties to the arbitration may cause the award or a signed copy thereof to be filed in Court in the manner prescribed in rule No.3.”

(Emphasis is supplied)

40. Perusal of the Said Rule makes it abundantly clearly that an Award can be filed by not just the Arbitrator/Umpire but by the parties to the arbitration proceedings as well. Section 14 at the Act does not obligate the Arbitrator/Umpire to provide the parties with signed copies of the Award. The said provision also does not pose an obstacle before the Arbitrator/Umpire from providing un-signed copies of the Award to the Parties. Where the Arbitrator/Umpire provides the parties with signed copies the Award, they or any of them would be at liberty to file the same in the Court on the basis of Rule 10 ibid.

41. The Hon’ble High Court of Sindh in the case titled, Syed Ziauddin Syed Roze-ud-Din (1999 YLR 978), after making reference to the Rules made by the Hon’ble Lahore High Court, held that an Award can be filed in the court not only by the Arbitrator/Umpire but also by any of the parties to the Award.

42. Likewise, in the case titled, Ganga Ram v. Radha Kishen (AIR 1955 Punjab 145), it was held that “in a case falling under Section 14(2) of the Act, the Arbitrator/ Umpire is called upon to file the award while in a case falling within Rule 10, the Award may be filed by an of the parties to the arbitration.”

43. Further guidance may be sought from the cases titled Province of the Punjab v. M.A. Rashid Said Alam Khan (PLD 1990 Lahore 25) and Mrs. Keaye Byrne v. M. Obaidullah Khan (PLD 1959 Lahore 146).

44. In sequel to what has been discussed above, this Court reached to an irresistible conclusion that the impugned judgment and decree dated 31.05.2019 passed by learned civil Court is based on sound reasons and thus does not call for any interference by this Court. Consequently, the captioned Appeal and the Civil Revision Petition being without any merit, are dismissed accordingly, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal and petition both fail. Dismissed.

Appeal dismissed

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