2025 SCLR 35

Other citations: PLD 2025 SC 516 = 2025 SCP 348 = 2025 SCP 347 = 2025 SCP 357 = 2025 SCP 361

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Naeem Akhter Afghan, Shahid Bilal Hassan, Salahuddin Panhwar and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ

Justice Mohsin Akhtar Kayani and others — Petitioners

versus

The President of Pakistan, Pak Secretariat, Islamabad and others — Respondents

Constitution Petitions No. 22, 20, 25 to 28 & 30 of 2025 and C.M.A.2136/2025 IN C.P.22/2025 and C.M.A.2137/2025 IN C.P.20/2025 and C.M.A.2138/2025 IN C.P.26/2025 and C.M.A.2139/2025 IN C.P.27/2025 and C.M.A.2047/2025 IN C.P.28/2025 (Stay applications), decided on 18th September, 2025.

(Constitutional Petitions U/A 184(3) of the Constitution for declaring Notification No. F.10 (2)/2024-A.II dated 1st February 2025 regarding Transfer of Judges to Islamabad High Court as Illegal and Unconstitutional)

HEADNOTES

Majority View — Per Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

(a) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Arts. 200 & 175A — Transfer of High Court judges — Transfer as constitutional alternative to appointment — Power of transfer, not curtailed by appointment mechanism — Scope — Petitioners assailed the notification issued by President of Pakistan in exercise of powers conferred under Article 200 for transfer of certain judges from provincial High Courts to Islamabad High Court on permanent basis — Petitioners argued that Article 200 of the Constitution, if properly construed, allows only temporary transfers of High Court Judges, which is essentially a short-term deputation, and does not envisage permanently relocating a Judge in a manner that effectively vacates his original seat and that a “permanent” transfer would encroach upon Article 175A, which establishes the Judicial Commission of Pakistan for appointments to superior courts — Validity — Articles 200 and 175A are two distinct and separate provisions dealing with two widely divergent situations without overlapping or overriding each other — The transfer of a judge by the President of Pakistan by means of Article 200 of the Constitution (permanently or temporarily) cannot be deduced as a fresh appointment expressly or tacitly — What’s more, the powers of transfer bestowed to the President by the framers of the Constitution cannot be obliterated or disregarded on the ground as to why the vacant posts were not filled up by Judicial Commission of Pakistan through fresh appointments rather than transfer — If it is reckoned or envisaged that all posts should be filled by the Judicial Commission of Pakistan alone through fresh appointments and not through transfer by the President, then such interpretation will not only contradict the discernible purpose and objective of the framers of the Constitution but will also invalidate the bedrock and substance of Article 200 of the Constitution which is unequivocally an independent right and power not interconnected or interrelated with the life-force of Article 175A of the Constitution — Rather, it is a standalone provision specifically dealing with the exigencies of the transfer of judges of a High Court (permanently or temporarily) which cannot be reckoned a fresh appointment which is the sense of duty Judicial Commission of Pakistan inherently and unreservedly in terms of Article 175A of the Constitution and has nothing to do with the transfer of High Court Judges from one High Court to another — The transfer of a judge from one High Court cannot deemed to be a fresh appointment to the office but the status of a transferee judge remains the same as appointed primarily under Article 193 of the Constitution and mere change of venue does not alter his original engagement but a reallocation of an existing resource. [A]

(b) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Arts. 200 & 175A — Transfer of High Court judges — Non-filing of vacancies through Article 175A — Transfer cannot be nullified on insistence of fresh appointments — Scope — Petitioners assailed the notification issued by President of Pakistan in exercise of powers conferred under Article 200 for transfer of certain judges from provincial High Courts to Islamabad High Court on permanent basis — Petitioners argued that transferring a Judge to fill a vacant judgeship in another High Court bypasses the Judicial Commission of Pakistan’s constitutional mandate for making a fresh appointment to that vacancy, thereby rendering Article 175A ineffective if such transfers are permitted without the Judicial Commission of Pakistan’s involvement — Validity — Had the framers of Constitution intended to subsume the transfer of judges from one High Court to other entirely under the Judicial Commission of Pakistan regime or deliberation, they would either have repealed Article 200 in the 18th Amendment or included language in Article 175A to govern transfers also but substratum of Article 200 still remains unchanged which demonstrates the intention of framers of Constitution manifestly that neither they aspired to vest in such powers to Judicial Commission of Pakistan, nor they amended or diluted the exactitudes of Article 200 of the Constitution — A transfer by the President under Article 200 cannot be questioned on the ground that the vacancy should have been filled by the Judicial Commission of Pakistan through a fresh appointment — To hold otherwise would not only contradict the manifest intention of the Constitution’s framers but effectively read Article 200 out of the book — Article 200 is a valid, self-contained constitutional mechanism for transferring High Court Judges, (permanently or temporarily) and its invocation in the present case does not violate or subvert Article 175A by any means — The two provisions neither overlap nor override each other, nor is there any disharmony or dissonance amongst them which need to be reconciled or resolved. [W]

(c) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Transfer of High Court judges — Transfer, not restricted to limited period — No time limit prescribed for transfer — Allowances confined to temporary transfer — Scope — Petitioners assailed the notification issued by President of Pakistan in exercise of powers conferred under Article 200 for transfer of certain judges from provincial High Courts to Islamabad High Court on permanent basis — Petitioners argued that sub-article (1) of Article 200 should be read in conjunction with sub-article (2) and if both are read together, it accentuates that the transfer can be made only for limited period — Validity — To keep with the letter of law, neither the aforesaid constitutional provisions can be given restrictive meaning nor it can be presumed that this provision can be applied only for time constraint transfer or for transfer for a specific period and not permanent, merely for the reason that under sub-article (2) it is provided that during the period for which a Judge of the High Court is transferred, he will be entitled to such allowances and privileges, in addition to his salary, as the President may by Order determine — The effect of payment of allowances and privileges, in addition to the salary is confined in the exigency of temporary transfer for specific period and not for the permanent transfer — The analogy drawn by the petitioners is structured on the erstwhile provisions integrated under Article 200 where the transfers could be made for one year or two years without the consent of a judge intended or likely to be transferred but quite the reverse, the present configuration and constituents of Article 200, explains in simple terms that no deadline or closing date/period is provided for the transfer of judge from one High Court to another which connotes that in the present structure of Article 200 of the Constitution, the transfer can be effected both temporarily and permanently but the notification of transfer issued by the President should specify the nature of transfer fair and square without leaving this important aspect in limbo which has its own repercussions and ramifications such as, if the transfer is on permanent basis then obviously, the seat of said transferred judge in his original place of appointment (High Court) will be vacant and opened for appointment of a new judge in his place within the prescribed strength of judges by Judicial Commission of Pakistan — Even a glimpse of Article 25 of the High Court Judges (Leave, Pension and Privileges) Order, 1997, accentuates that it is almost analogous and interconnected with sub-article (2) of Article 200 of the Constitution — What it shows in the eyes of law is that the monthly allowance is payable only during the period for which a person serves as a Judge of the High Court or at the Bench to which he is transferred and yet again we observe that this condition applies only in temporary transfer and not in the event of permanent transfer. [H, J & K]

(d) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 & 48 — Rules of Business, 1973, R. 15A — Transfer of High Court judges — President to act on advice — Reference to the President — Scope — Petitioners assailed the notification issued by President of Pakistan in exercise of powers conferred under Article 200 for transfer of certain judges from provincial High Courts to Islamabad High Court on permanent basis — Petitioners argued that the transfer summary should have been approved by the Federal Cabinet before sending it by the Prime Minster to the President — Validity — This argument also does not hold water — If the plain language of Article 48 of the Constitution is vetted, it is clearly conversed that in the exercise of functions, the President shall act on and in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister — The summary moved by the Prime Minster neither transgresses the command of Article 48 of the Constitution nor it offended the dictates laid down in the case of Mustafa Impex — It is also somewhat reminiscent to call attention to Rule 15-A of the Rules of Business 1973, Cabinet Secretariat (Cabinet Division) Islamabad, wherein it is provided that in terms of any provision of the Constitution or under any other statutory provision any function is to be performed or any orders have to be issued by the President or his specific approval is required, the Division concerned shall incorporate a paragraph to this effect in the summary entitled as “Summary for the Prime Minister” — The Prime Minister shall render his advice and submit the case to the President — After the President has seen and approved the case, it shall be returned to the Prime Minister — The cases to which this rule applies are enumerated in Schedule V-B (List of Cases Requiring Orders of the President on the Advice of the Prime Minister) — In Schedule V-B, item at Serial No.32 under the nomenclature of “Law and Justice Division” is germane to the High Court, its number of Judges, appointment of Chief Justices, Acting Chief Justices and other Judges and their transfers, removal, allowances and privileges with reference to Constitutional provisions such as Article 192(1), 193(1), 196, 197, 200 and 209(6). [M]

Mustafa Impex, Karachi versus The Government of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 808) relied.

(e) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Arts. 200 & 175A — Islamabad High Court Act (XVII of 2010), S. 3 — Transfer of High Court judge — Appointment vis-à-vis transfer — No express or implied prohibition on transfer — Subordinate legislation cannot override constitution — Scope — Petitioners assailed the notification issued by President of Pakistan in exercise of powers conferred under Article 200 for transfer of certain judges from provincial High Courts to Islamabad High Court on permanent basis — The petitioners leaned on the phrase “to be appointed from the provinces and other territories” as the sticking point and argued that the life and soul of this provision emphasizes the mode of induction into Islamabad High Court by appointment through Judicial Commission of Pakistan rather than the transfer of judges from other High Courts — Validity — Argument is based on a misreading of section 3 of Islamabad High Court Act, 2010 and an improper attempt without any rhyme or reason to give a subordinate legislation primacy over the Constitution — In all conscience, if we look into the pith and substance, section 3 is an ordinary law provision and by no means deemed to be so sacrosanct or sacred with the ability or proficiency to override or curtail express constitutional powers of the President conferred under Article 200 of the Constitution — Even, an astute reading of section 3 ricochets that it essentially fixes the composition of the IHC (1 Chief Justice + 12 Judges) and indicates that these Judges are to hail from various federating units consistent with the federal character of the Court — It does not candidly set down the method of appointment except “in accordance with the Constitution” — We are sanguine that section 3 is germane to the appointment but it does not expressly or impliedly debar or restrict that a judge can only join the Islamabad High Court through a fresh appointment for all time to come and not by way of a transfer — To get hold of such interpretation amounts the overriding Article 200 of the Constitution — If primacy is accorded to section 3 of the Islamabad High Court Act, 2010, it would be constitutional non sequitur — Section 3 of the Islamabad High Court Act, 2010 proffers no bar to the impugned transfers — The transfers were made in accordance with the Constitution and there was no violation of the provincial representation principle — Section 3 of Islamabad High Court Act, 2010 cannot be read to attribute redundancy or severance to Article 200’s operation or to rein in the provisions of Constitution and its supremacy — Consequently, the transfers to Islamabad High Court are neither unconstitutional nor illegal on the anvil of Section 3 of the Islamabad High Court Act, 2010. [A²]

(f) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Transfer of High Court judges — Not prejudicial to public interest — Seniority of judges, an incidental consequence of transfer — Scope — Petitioners assailed the notification issued by President of Pakistan in exercise of powers conferred under Article 200 for transfer of certain judges from provincial High Courts to Islamabad High Court on permanent basis — The petitioners also anchored much of their challenge to the ways and means of the transfer of judges on the principle of judicial independence which in substance undermined the internal seniority of a High Court — Validity — The phrase public interest to a certain degree denote the state of affairs in which public at large had some interest or where their rights or liabilities are jeopardized but it does not mean to espouse or harbor personal rights or personal interests under the garb of public interest — Although the expression “public interest” has not been defined in any law, however, this expression is to be understood and interpreted in the light of entire scheme, purpose and object of the enactment — Nothing is articulated as to why and how the transfers of judges have affected the public interest despite express provision in the Constitution; whether due to the transfer, the Islamabad High Court’s working has come to a dead halt, or stalemate and whether the transferee judges are not performing their duties according to the roster or the Court is not regularly functioning — Just for the reason of affecting seniority of few existing judges by one transferee judge, the transfers cannot be declared against public interest — The best interest of public at large is always with the expeditious disposal of their cases and not in forum shopping. [D²]

Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324), Presidential Reference No. 2 of 1996 (PLD 1997 SC 84) relied.

(g) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Transfer of High Court judges — Notification of transfer should specify nature (temporary/permanent) — Seniority of transferee judges, determination of — Scope — Petitioners assailed the notification issued by President of Pakistan in exercise of powers conferred under Article 200 for transfer of certain judges from provincial High Courts to Islamabad High Court on permanent basis — The petitioners also anchored much of their challenge to the ways and means of the transfer of judges on the principle of judicial independence which in substance undermined the internal seniority of a High Court — Validity — Since notification of transfer issued by the President in exercise of powers conferred under Article 200, it was not demonstrable whether the transfer is temporary or permanent which was also directly linked up with the fixation of seniority — Therefore, sanguine to the situation that in normal circumstances, the decision on the disputes relating to the inter se seniority is within the dominion of the Chief Justice of that High Court at the administrative side — Right now, the issue of seniority was not cropped up between the existing strength of judges of IHC but the dispute was related to the seniority of transferee judges — Though the Attorney General argued that the transfer seems to be permanent but whether the transfer is permanent or temporary, this should be specifically mentioned in the notification of transfer — It is also a ground reality that there is no All Pakistan Cadre/unified or combined seniority list of High Court judges for determining their seniority at the time of transfer, hence, in the fitness of things, by means of short order, Supreme Court partially remanded the matter to the President of Pakistan, without upsetting the Notification of transfer, to determine the seniority in accordance with Article 200 of the Constitution, including the question whether the transfer is on a permanent or temporary basis. [F²]

(h) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Arts. 200, 193 & 194 — Transfer of High Court judges — Fresh oath not required on transfer — Scope — Petitioners assailed the notification issued by President of Pakistan in exercise of powers conferred under Article 200 for transfer of certain judges from provincial High Courts to Islamabad High Court on permanent basis — Petitioners vigorously opposed the whole action of transfer being illegal and unconstitutional but as a fall back, they argued that fresh oath was not taken by the transferee judges and made an alternate prayer that the transferee judges cannot be considered judges of the Islamabad High Court until the take oath as justices of the Islamabad High Court pursuant to Article 194 read together with Third Schedule of the Constitution — The bedrock of this argument was that had they taken fresh oath, they would be considered juniors to the existing strength of judges and their seniority would be reckoned at the bottom of seniority list — Validity — The appointment of a Judge of a High Court is governed under Article 193, whereby the Chief Justice and each of other Judges of a High Court is appointed by the President in accordance with Article 175A and under Article 194, before entering upon office, the Chief Justice of a High Court shall make before the Governor, and any other Judge of the Court shall make before the Chief Justice, oath in the form set out in the Third Schedule, provided that the Chief Justice of the Islamabad High Court shall make oath before the President and other Judges of that Court shall make oath before the Chief Justice of the Islamabad High Court — If a person becomes a judge of High Court, he continues to occupy the office till the age of superannuation unless he resigns earlier or removed from office — So for all practical purposes, if a judge is transferred to another High Court, he does not enter upon a new office. [E²]

Muhammad Aslam Awan, Advocate v. Federation of Pakistan (2014 SCMR 1289) relied.

(i) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Transfer of High Court judges — Allegations of malice — Transfer not invalidated by unproven allegations — Scope — Petitioners argued that the transfer of judges appears to be based on malice in fact and malice in in law — The five learned judges petition had also alleged that they sent a letter (Six judges letter) and disclosed certain instances where the executive’s functionaries had attempted to meddle in the judiciary’s functions and Supreme Court has initiated proceeding by means of a Suo Motu case — The petitioners blame that the transfer of outside judges have been made in the IHC vide impugned notification to victimize the six judges due to writing a letter by them (almost before eleven months of transfer notification) — Validity — The fragment of arguments relating to the letter which is sub judice in some other proceedings cannot be taken and decided in the present proceedings — Any remark, comment or observation made in the present proceedings regarding the pending Suo Motu case may seriously prejudice the outcome of sub judice matter in which various serious issues have been raised and require independent application of mind and decision without mixing it with other case or cases — Moreover, various Constitution Petitions challenging the 26th Constitutional Amendment are also pending in this Court — Therefore, no observations can be made to said pending proceedings as well in the present proceedings — It was further alleged that the Chief Justice concerned appears to have been rendered pliable to act on the wishes of the Establishment — In the present proceedings Supreme Court has to figure out and decide whether the inbuilt mechanism provided under Article 200 of the Constitution has been fulfilled or not? — Seemingly, entire procedure has been followed in letter and spirit and consent was accorded with proper application of mind which is manifestly reflecting from the concurrence accorded by the consultees that was further reinforced and fortified through the replies filed by Registrars of the High Court and Supreme Court of Pakistan — As a Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court, by all means, we want to stick to our domain and decide the legal implications and compliances rather than delving into the allegations leveled against the consultees, which is otherwise uncalled for and unwarranted, therefore, we cannot pass any declaration to the effect whether the Chief Justice concerned were pliable on wishes of the Establishment or not? — Such allegations can be leveled easily against each and every transfer if made under Article 200 because the procedure and consultees will always remain the same i.e. the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justices of both High Courts unless Article 200 of the Constitution is amended or substituted. [H²]

(j) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Transfer of High Court judges — Four-tier formula: consent of judge, consultation with Chief Justice of Pakistan, originating High Court, and transferee High Court — Safeguard of judicial independence — Scope — The forthright rendition of Article 200 conveys that it is consciously and purposefully barricaded with conditions to ensure that the power of transfer of High Court Judge should not be misused by the executive to the detriment of judicial independence, therefore, a “four tier formula” is encapsulated i.e. (i) the consent of the Judge concerned; (ii) consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan; (iii) consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court from which the Judge is to be transferred; and (iv) consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court to which the Judge is to be transferred — The requirement that no Judge shall be transferred without his consent is an emphatic recognition of a judge’s personal and professional stakes in his posting — It acknowledges that transferring a Judge is not a trivial matter; it uproots him from familiar surroundings, possibly compels relocation of family, changes his pool of cases and lawyers, and might affect his chances for future elevation — Thus, the Constitution grants him first choice or first right of refusal — If he refuses, the matter ends forthwith at the very initial stage — The next tier of protection is the consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan — The Chief Justice of Pakistan’s consent is the linchpin, being paterfamilias of the judicial family. [X]

Union of India v. Sankal Chand Himatlal Sheth & Anr. (1978 (1) SCR 423 = AIR 1977 SC 2328), S.P.Gupta v. Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 149), Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India (AIR 1994 SC 268), In Re: Presidential Reference (AIR 1999 SC 1), Supreme Court Advocate-on-Record Association And Other v. Union of India ([2016] 5 SCC 1) relied.

(k) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Transfer of High Court judges — Four-tier formula: consent of judge, consultation with Chief Justice of Pakistan, originating High Court, and transferee High Court — Safeguard of judicial independence — Scope — The power of transfer by the President is not unregulated or unbridled but structured on a four-tier formula — Hence, for all intents and purposes, it is resonated without any possibility of doubt, that in the inbuilt procedure and mechanism, the right of rejection or primacy/dominance is within the strict sphere and realm of judiciary and not within the domain or province of executives — Therefore, it does not in any case compromise the independence of the judiciary where the option to accept or reject the transfer’s proposal is vociferously within the hands of the judiciary without any compromise, which neither disparage the independence of judiciary nor put it at peril insofar as the decision making authority or consent remains within the control of judiciary. [Z]

(l) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Transfer of High Court judges — ‘Public interest’ not a condition precedent — Decision left to consultees as sole arbiters — Scope — Albeit, the forthright reading of Article 200 of the Constitution makes explicit that the “public interest” is not condition precedent or a hard and fast rule according to the language couched in the said provision for the transfer but in our view, the pros and cons of this onerous task is left to be decided by the consultees as sole arbiters in terms of Article 200 of the Constitution. [C²]

(m) Interpretation of statutes —

— Harmonious construction — Scope — The golden rule of statutory interpretation provides that the words used should be interpreted harmoniously and congenially in line with the intention of the legislature and all the provisions should be read in unison, for the reason that the foremost stratagem of this doctrine is to preserve the effect of the statute within the precincts of law and within the dominion of Constitution, provided that the statute is mute and/or inarticulate and is capable of more than one interpretation. [B]

(n) Interpretation of Constitution —

— To be read as a whole — Harmony of provisions — Liberally and purposively construed — Trichotomy of powers respected — Pith and substance doctrine applied — Scope — While interpreting the Constitution, it is to be read as a whole without obliterating or annihilating the other provisions to ensure the rule of harmony — To understand its primordial and elemental commandments, and the language used in various Articles, it is necessary to consider the historical background and the textual and structural substratum for its literal interpretation with liberal enforcement — It is a well settled exposition of law that a written constitution is, in essence, a form of statute which needs to be interpreted liberally and read holistically as an organic document which contemplates the trichotomy of powers between the three organs of the State, namely, the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary — The doctrine of pith and substance places considerable emphasis on figuring out the distinct attributes of constitutional provisions, and the doctrine of purposive interpretation lays down a duty upon the Courts to interpret the statute or the Constitution keeping in mind the purposefulness for which the provision in question was legislated while adopting a result-oriented approach, rather than construing it in a restrictive or stringent sense. [C]

Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th ed.) by P. J. Fitzgerald, M.A. relied.

(o) Interpretation of Constitution —

— No provision to be treated as redundant — Scope — Redundancy cannot be attributed to any provision of the Constitution rather in case of any conflict in two provisions, the rule of harmonious interpretation is to be followed. [D]

(p) Interpretation of Constitution —

— Literal, purposive, and harmonious construction — Basic structure inviolable — Constitution paramount over other laws — Scope — Constitutional interpretation entails evaluating the text, structure, history, and underlying principles of a constitution to determine its interpretation and scope, and to drive the formation of legal doctrine and precedents — The general rules of interpretation of the Constitution are: the words must be given full effect if they are clear and unambiguous; the Constitution must be read in its entirety; harmonic construction principles should be used; the Constitution must be interpreted liberally; the court must determine the intent of the constitution by looking beyond its literal words; when interpreting, it’s acceptable to use both internal and external help and all other laws are subordinate to the Constitution whereas the guiding principles and modes of interpretation to approach and decipher literal interpretation of constitutional text (Textualism); emphasis on purpose and spirit of the Constitution (Purposivism); some constitutional principles are inviolable (Basic Structure) and avoiding conflict among different constitutional provisions (Harmonious Construction). [E]

A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189-90 (1987) relied.

(q) Interpretation of Constitution —

— Distinct from statutory interpretation — Provisions to be read dynamically and meaningfully — Harmonious construction applied to avoid redundancy — Scope — Seemingly the errand of elucidating and rationalizing a Constitution is stringently distinct from that of interpreting a statute, for a statute defines present rights and obligations and is easily enacted and as easily repealed and where two provisions in legislation are in such disagreement with each other that both of them cannot stand together, it is possible that they should be so read that effect can be given to both because it will not be a viable option to embrace a construction that renders both of them ineffective and useless — A Constitution is drafted with an eye to the future and its function is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power and each provision of it has to be given meaningful and dynamic and vigorous interpretation rather than making it antediluvian or superfluous. [F]

Hunter v. Southam Inc: [1984] 2 SCR 145 relied.

(r) Interpretation of Constitution —

— The primary aim of the Courts is to get the bottom of the objectives of the constitutional provision and then proceed with an interpretation that lends support thereto. [L]

Heydon’s Case ((1584) 76 ER 637) and Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th ed.), at page 228 relied.

(s) Interpretation of statutes —

— Harmonious Construction — Scope — The Doctrine of Harmonious Construction is based on a cardinal principle in law that every statute has been formulated with a specific purpose and intention and thereby should be read as a whole and essence is to give effect to both the provisions — To avoid conflict, the adopted “interpretation of the statute” should be consistent with all its provisions. [G]

Hamza Rasheed Khan v. Election Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and others, PLD 2024 SC 1028, Reference No. 1 of 2020 (Secrecy of Ballot in Senate Elections), PLD 2021 SC 825, Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others, 2015 SCMR 1739, District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2015 SC 401, Case regarding pensionary benefits of Judges of the Superior Courts, PLD 2013 SC 829, Qazi Hussain Ahmad v. General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive and others, PLD 2002 SC 853, Abdul Razzaq Khokhar v. Province of Punjab and others, 1990 SCMR 183, Hafiz Abdul Waheed v. Mrs. Asma Jehangir and another, PLD 2004 SC 219, Johnson v. Moreton, (1978) 3 All ER 37, Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd., (1978) 1 All ER 948, Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57; AIR 2003 SC 3942, Sultana Begum v. Premchand Jain, AIR 1997 SC 1006, Jagdish Singh v. Lt. Governor, Delhi & Others, AIR 1997 SC 2239, S. Nagraj (Dead) by LRs & Others v. B. R. Vasudeva Murthy & Others, (2010) 3 SCC 353, SBEC Sugar Ltd. & Another v. Union of India & Others, (2011) 4 SCC 668, State of Rajasthan v. Gopi Kishan Sen, AIR 1992 SC 1754, East India Hotels Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 231, P.S. Sattappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd., 2004 (11) SCC 672, Sarabjit Rick Singh v. Union of India, 2008 (2) SCC 417 and Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A., (2002) 4 SCC 105 relied.

(t) Words and phrases —

— ‘Read in conjunction with each other’ — Scope — To all intents and purposes, the phrase “conjunction” doesn’t necessarily imply that there’s a conflict — It simply means that the provisions are related and their collective meaning is what matters — Summarily, read in conjunction with each other means do not interpret one provision in isolation without considering the implications and context provided by the others; recognize that the meaning, scope, or application of one provision might be clarified, qualified, or even limited by another and the full and accurate meaning emerges only when all referenced parts are considered as a whole. [I]

(u) Words and phrases —

— Constitutional lens — Scope — Phrase “Constitutional lens” in literal sense denotes the interpretation and decision of cases within the framework of a constitution — By means of this lens, the Courts while exploring every avenue may scrutinize and survey the laws and policies vis-à-vis the provisions of the constitution to reach a conclusion whether it scaffolds the fundamental laws and tenets or not. [N]

(v) Words and phrases —

— Consultation — Meaning — Consultation refers to the process whereby people exchange views and information — It is not just a one-way process, but a process of sharing knowledge and opinions. [Y]

Black’s Law Dictionary, Collins Dictionary, Oxford Learners Dictionaries, Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Al-Jehad Trust through Raeesul Mujahideen Habib-ul-Wahabb-ul-Khairi v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1996 Supreme Court 324) relied.

(w) Words and phrases —

— Public interest — Scope — The term “public interest” refers to the welfare or well-being of the general public — In administrative law, the term “public interest” refers to the collective well-being, security, and proper functioning of society and the state, as weighed against individual or private interests — It is a guiding principle used by government authorities to justify actions and decisions, such as transfers, suspensions, regulations, or restrictions, that may affect individuals but are claimed to benefit the broader public — It carries legitimacy and justifies coercion and it has done so ever since “salus populi suprema lex esto” (the welfare of the people is the supreme law, enunciates the idea of law). [B²]

English Biscuits Manufacturers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Monopoly Control Authority and another, 2005 CLD 264, Abu Dhabi Medical Devices Co. L.L.C. v. Federation of Pakistan through the Ministry of Health and another, 2010 CLC 1253, Dossani Travels (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Travels Shop (Pvt.) Ltd., PLD 2014 SC 1, Premium Battery Industries Limited v. Karachi Water Sewerage Board, 2018 SCMR 365, Malik Muhammad Bashir Lakhesar, Assistant Advocate General Punjab v. Government of Punjab, 2019 PLC (C.S.) 266, Ashfaq Ahmad Kharal and 21 others v. Province of Punjab through Secretary, Law and Parliamentary Affairs and others, PLD 2024 Lahore 129, Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and others, AIR 1993 SC 892 relied.

(x) Words and phrases —

— Malice in law — Scope — In the practical and methodical legal acuteness, malice in law does not deduce an act done with an inappropriate or reprehensible motive but it implies a wrongful act done intentionally without cause or excuse — It insinuates a wrongful aspiration and objective, presumed in the case of an unlawful act, rather than a bad motive or feeling of ill-will — In the legal terminology, malice in law is interconnected to the actions that are intrinsically illegal, heedless of the actual intent of the committer. [G²]

(y) Administration of justice —

— Duty of judge — Judicial populism — Scope — Judicial populism triggers when judicial branches are much more influenced by the people and render the decisions according to the will of people which is not precisely the role of judiciary — The role of a constitutional judge is different from that of a King, who is free to exert power and pass orders of his choice over his subjects — Vesting of judicial power does not mean to exercise as per will of the judge but effect is ought to have given the will of the law and Constitution — Under the guise or semblance of populist approach, the judges cannot indulge in electing and opting public opinion and emotions for overshadowing or eroding established constitutional and legal provisions. [V]

Mian Irfan Bashir Vs. Deputy Commissioner (D.C.), Lahore (PLD 2021 Supreme Court 571), That Eminent Tribunal: Judicial Supremacy and the Constitution” authored by Christopher Wolfe. relied.

(z) Maxim —

— A verbis legis non recedendum est — Meaning — From the words of the law, there must be no departure. [O]

(a²) Maxim —

— Verba cum effectu accipienda sunt — Meaning — Words are to be understood so as to give them effect or words are to be construed as to their effect. [P]

(b²) Maxim —

— Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex — Meaning — When the reason for the law ceases, the law itself ceases. [Q]

(c²) Maxim —

— Ut res magis valet quam pereat — Meaning — The thing may have effect rather than be destroyed or it is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void — Meaning thereby that while interpreting the laws, the validity of legal provision should be guarded rather than rendering it totally ineffective or invalid. [S]

(d²) Maxim —

— Aequitas nunquam contravenit leges — Meaning — Equity never contradicts the law — Indeed this maxim provides a proactive guiding force that equity can complement where the strict application of law might be unjust — In essence, doctrine of equity can operate as a corrective measure within the leaps of law but not as a devices or tool to nullify the express provision of law. [T]

(e²) Maxim —

— Iudicis est ius dicere, non dare — Meaning — This maxim is of great magnitude which focuses on the role and sense of duty of judges — It deciphers that “it is for the judge to declare the law, not to give it” — This draws a dynamic distinction between the legislative function of making laws and the judicial function of interpreting and applying them in its veritable intellect. [U]

Concurring Note — Per Salahuddin Panhwar, J

(f²) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Arts. 200 & 2A — Transfer of High Court judges — Independence of judiciary — Scope — Petitioners challenge the notification issued by President of Pakistan in exercise of powers conferred under Article 200 for transfer of certain judges from provincial High Courts to Islamabad High Court on permanent basis — Petitioners contend that the transfers in question violate Article 2A and compromise the independence of the judiciary — Validity — This argument is unsupported by the constitutional framework — Article 200 imposes clear safeguards — The powers of the President to transfer is subject to the consent of the judge and mandatory consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justices of the relevant High Courts — These procedural prerequisites minimise the risk of executive overreach — Transfers made in compliance with these safeguards are constitutionally sound and promote the larger objectives of national integration, equitable representation, and institutional diversity. [P²]

(g²) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Transfer of High Court judges — Permanent transfer — Scope — Petitioners assail the notification issued by President of Pakistan in exercise of powers conferred under Article 200 for transfer of certain judges from provincial High Courts to Islamabad High Court on permanent basis — Petitioners argue that Article 200 provides only for temporary transfers of judges — Validity — This contention is based on a misreading of the provision — Article 200(3) explicitly allows the temporary increase in the number of judges by enabling the Chief Justice of one High Court to request the services of a judge from another High Court “for such period as may be necessary” — The temporal limitation in sub-Article (3) is deliberate and specific — In contrast, Article 200(1), which empowers the President to transfer a judge from one High Court to another, contains no such qualifying language — The omission is significant and must be given its full constitutional weight — If the framers had intended to impose a temporal limitation on transfers under Article 200(1), they would have done so expressly — The distinction in language between the two sub-articles confirms that transfers under Article 200(1) are not inherently temporary — Accordingly, the petitioners’ argument, equating the nature of all transfers with the mechanism in Article 200(3), cannot be sustained in light of the constitutional text and legislative intent. [U²]

(h²) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Transfer of High Court judges — Scope — Petitioners assailed the notification issued by President of Pakistan in exercise of powers conferred under Article 200 for transfer of certain judges from provincial High Courts to Islamabad High Court on permanent basis — Validity — In a pluralistic constitutional democracy, the legitimacy of coercive public decisions rests not on private morality or sectarian belief, but on shared constitutional values such as the rule of law, equality, federalism, and democratic governance — In this respect, courts are expected to articulate their reasoning in a manner that affirms the common interpretive commitments of the Constitution — The judicial transfers in question uphold the constitutional essence of federalism, fostering national unity and integrity by ensuring equitable representation from diverse provinces — By advancing the federal character of the judiciary, these decisions promote balanced regional representation, thereby serving the collective interests of the nation and reinforcing the fabric of Pakistani nationality — A judiciary that reflects regional and linguistic diversity is more likely to command public confidence and administer justice in a manner that is inclusive, impartial, and contextually informed — This approach aligns with the doctrine of constitutional public reason, which demands not only formal compliance with the Constitution, but also substantive justification in terms that are rooted in shared constitutional values. [V²]

(i²) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Transfer of High Court judges — Scope — A plain reading of Article 200(1) establishes, that the President may transfer a Judge of a High Court to another High Court, provided two essential conditions are satisfied: first, the consent of the concerned Judge must be obtained; second, the President must consult the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justices of both the transferring and receiving High Courts — These conditions serve as constitutional safeguards, preventing arbitrariness and securing institutional integrity — When a constitutional provision is unambiguous in its language and intent, the Court should adhere to its plain meaning and not extend its interpretation beyond the explicit terms, regardless of potential implications for individual cases — Article 200 provides a self-contained procedure and does not require further elaboration. [R²]

Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. v. S.K. Pvt. Ltd. (2025 SCMR 570) relied.

(j²) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Arts. 200 & 175A — Islamabad High Court Act (XVII of 2010), S. 3 — Judicial Commission of Pakistan (Appointment of Judges) Rules, 2024, R. 6 — Transfer of High Court judges — Scope — Article 200 of the Constitution is clear in its language and intent — It does not contain any ambiguity that would require interpretative expansion or doctrinal elaboration — The prerequisites for a lawful transfer are the consent of the Judge concerned and consultations — As these are the only conditions stipulated by the Constitution, the issuance of the transfer notifications cannot be deemed unconstitutional or unlawful — Supreme Court is not at liberty to introduce new requirements where the Constitution itself has chosen not to impose them — The requirement of consent and consultation under Article 200, the representative design of the Judicial Commission under Article 175A (6), the language of section 3 of the Islamabad High Court Act, 2010, and the mandate of rule 6 of the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (Appointment of Judges) Rules, 2024, all point to the same conclusion — The Islamabad High Court must be a federal representative court, inclusive in character and reflective of the nation’s pluralistic identity. [T² & W²]

Sharaf Faridi v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1994 SC 105), Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324) relied.

(k²) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Arts. 200 & 194 — Transfer of High Court judge — Transfer is not appointment — Fresh oath, not required — Scope — Article 194 of the Constitution provides that a Judge of a High Court must make an oath before entering office in the form prescribed by the Third Schedule — This requirement affirms the constitutional values of integrity, impartiality, and fidelity to the law — However, this provision must be read in conjunction with Articles 175A and 200 — Article 175A outlines the procedure for initial appointments through the Judicial Commission and the Parliamentary Committee — Article 200, in contrast, permits the transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another with the consent of the judge and in consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justices of both High Courts involved — The textual and structural distinction between “appointment” and “transfer” is constitutionally significant — A judge transferred under Article 200 is not newly appointed but merely reassigned within the same constitutional office — The transfer does not interrupt tenure, affect jurisdictional authority, or require revalidation through oath — The constitutional oath taken under Article 194 continues to bind the judge throughout his or her service in the superior judiciary, irrespective of the High Court to which the judge is posted — It is therefore essential to distinguish between two constitutional categories: first, the initial appointment of a person as a High Court judge, which requires selection through the Judicial Commission and the taking of an oath under Article 194; and second, the transfer of a serving High Court judge to another High Court under Article 200, which is a lateral movement within the existing judicial cadre — The latter does not constitute a fresh appointment and does not entail a break in service — Consequently, no fresh oath is constitutionally required upon such a transfer. [X², Y² & Z²]

Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 161) relied.

(l²) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Transfer of High Court judges — Seniority list, preparation of — Scope — Any transfer to the Federal High Court depicts lack of standardisation which may result in inconsistencies, perceptions of arbitrariness, and occasional future disputes over the order of precedence — It is imperative that a consolidated and transparent seniority list be maintained for the said transfers — Therefore as a matter of judicial policy and institutional reform for transfers to the Federal High Court, a Unified National Seniority List of all High Court judges be prepared, maintained, and annually notified by the Office of the President, in consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan, to operate only for transfers to the Islamabad High Court (Federal High Court) and to be applied subject to the diversity principle — This list should be updated promptly upon any event affecting a judge’s status, such as elevation, retirement, resignation, death, transfer, or removal — This mechanism would promote consistency, procedural fairness, and institutional trust within the superior judiciary. [A³]

(m²) Interpretation of constitution —

— The Constitution is a multifaceted instrument; a single word at times carries one meaning in one context, and another in a totally different context — The words in the constitution are not part of an ordinary novel, which can be interpreted by placing a dictionary at one’s right and a grammar book on the left, these words cannot be looked through a cold eye of a lexicographer, but with a perception that they are formed in a single complex instrument, in which one part may throw light on another — The construction must hold a balance between all of its parts. [I²]

Holmes, J. in Towne v. Eisner (62 L Ed 372, 376) relied.

(n²) Interpretation of constitution —

— Interpretation of the Constitution requires more than linguistic precision — It demands fidelity to the structure, spirit, and purpose of the constitutional text — A constitutional term may derive different meanings from its surrounding context and the part it plays in the larger architecture of the document — The Constitution, unlike an ordinary statute or literary text, must be interpreted holistically. [J²]

(o²) Interpretation of constitution —

— A foundational principle of constitutional interpretation is that no single provision of the Constitution, unless expressly stated, can override another — The Constitution is to be construed as a coherent and integrated whole, with each provision complementing and sustaining the others. [K²]

Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana (2015 SCMR 1739), Hamza Rasheed Khan v. Election Appellate Tribunal, Lahore High Court (PLD 2024 SC 1028) relied.

(p²) Interpretation of Constitution —

— Harmonious construction — Scope — Harmonious interpretation is essential to preserve the structural integrity and purposive functioning of the Constitution — As in the constitutional context of Pakistan, the functionalist approach informed by textual fidelity has emerged as both a pragmatic and principled method of adjudication. [L²]

State v. Zia-ur-Rehman (PLD 1973 SC 49), Qazi Hussain Ahmad v. General Pervez Musharraf (PLD 2002 SC 853), Fauji Foundation v. Shamimur Rehman (PLD 1983 SC 457), Shahid Nabi Malik v. Chief Election Commissioner (PLD 1997 SC 32) relied.

(q²) Interpretation of Constitution —

— While the Constitution does not adopt a rigid doctrine of separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary remains a core constitutional value, warranting a contextual and purposive interpretive stance — Supreme Court has alternated between formalist and functionalist approaches depending on the constitutional question at hand. [M²]

Registrar, Supreme Court v. Wali Muhammad (1997 SCMR 141), Al-Raham Travels v. Ministry of Religious Affairs (2011 SCMR 1621), Province of Sindh v. MQM (PLD 2014 SC 531), Muhammad Aslam Awan v. Federation of Pakistan (2014 SCMR 1289) relied.

(r²) Interpretation of Constitution —

— Functionalism — Scope — Just as the apex of a tree cannot be reached without grounding in its roots, a constitutional court must begin its analysis at the foundation of the legal order, which is the judiciary itself — The judiciary, as one of the three co-equal organs of the State, is entrusted with the solemn duty of interpreting and upholding the Constitution in context of the Article 175(2) of the Constitution which affirms the jurisdiction of courts limited to that conferred by the Constitution or by statute — This constitutional design recognises the judiciary not merely as an arbiter of disputes, but as a constitutional organ that sustains the rule of law — Such functionalism, however, is not unconstrained — Functionalism must be informed by text; textualism, by function — This reconciliatory formulation anchors judicial reasoning in the constitutional text while permitting the judiciary to adapt its application to evolving governance contexts — Accordingly, functionalism, when disciplined by text, serves not as an instrument of judicial expansionism but as a necessary interpretive tool to preserve the Constitution’s spirit and ensure the effective discharge of each organ’s constitutional mandate — In sum, the interpretive framework must balance respect for the constitutional text with a functional sensitivity to the roles and responsibilities of each organ of the State — Functionalism, when guided by constitutional structure and disciplined by textual clarity, ensures that the Constitution is not only upheld in letter but animated in spirit. [N²]

Peter L Strauss, ‘A Softer Formalism’ (2011) 124 Harvard Law Review Forum 55 relied.

(s²) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Arts. 175 & 2A — Independence of judiciary — Scope — Independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of the constitutional order of Pakistan — Without it, the judiciary would lose its legitimacy as a neutral forum for the resolution of disputes and a guardian against constitutional transgression — Judicial independence, both institutional and individual, is expressly recognised in Articles 2A, 175, and the preamble to the Constitution — It comprises safeguards including security of tenure, impartial appointments, non-interference by the executive, protection from arbitrary transfers, and adequate financial autonomy. [O²]

(t²) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 175 — Independence of judiciary — Scope — Pakistan adopts a federal system of government based on a trichotomy of powers, wherein each organ of the State is required to function strictly within the bounds prescribed by the Constitution — The judiciary has been assigned a delicate and crucial role, namely to ensure that no organ of the State acts in violation of any constitutional provision or any law — In view of this responsibility, the framers of the Constitution envisaged an independent judiciary — However, the judiciary itself must also act within the limits of its jurisdiction in accordance with Article 175(2) of the Constitution, whereby courts are bound by defined jurisdictional parameters, exercising only the authority vested in them by the Constitution or legislative enactments — Therefore, the relevant constitutional provisions must be construed in a manner that ensures a balance among the three organs of the State — At the same time, such construction must affirm the independence of the judiciary as a foundational constitutional value. [Q²]

(u²) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 184 — Constitutional jurisdiction — Judicial review — Scope — Supreme Court possesses the power of judicial review to examine legislative and executive actions and to declare them unconstitutional if found ultra vires — This authority ensures adherence to the rule of law and serves as a vital check against misuse of power — Judicial review is properly invoked where a decision maker has acted beyond jurisdiction, misdirected itself in law, or improperly exercised authority. [S²]

Naseem Khan v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2024 SCMR 1341) relied.

Minority View — Per Naeem Akhter Afghan and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ

(v²) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Arts. 200 & 195 — Transfer of High Court judge — Scope — Clause (1) of Article 200 deals with the discretionary powers of the President to transfer a Judge of a High Court from one High Court to another High Court — Clause (2) of Article 200 deals with entitlement of the Transferee Judge to such allowances and privileges, in addition to his salary, as the President may determine, during the period for which he serves as a Judge in the High Court to which he is transferred — Clause (3) of Article 200 deals with the discretionary powers of the Chief Justice of a High Court to require a Judge of any other High Court to attend sittings of the former High Court for such period as may be necessary — Clause (3) of Article 200 has no connection with clause (1) and clause (2) of Article 200 and same is independent — However, clause (1) and clause (2) of Article 200 are interconnected and both are to be read in conjunction with each other — In fact clause (2), being subservient to clause (1), cannot be read in seclusion to clause (1) — For proper interpretation of clause (1), it has to be read together with clause (2) — While applying the doctrine of harmonious construction when clause (1) and clause (2) of the Article 200 of the Constitution are interpreted and read in conjunction with each other, it provide that in exercise of his discretion, the President may transfer a Judge of a High Court from one High Court to another High Court for a period i.e. tenure and during the period for which the Transferee Judge serves as a Judge of the High Court to which he is transferred, he is entitled to such allowances as privileges, in addition to his salary as determined by the President — Clause 25 of the President’s Order No.3 of 1997 also clarifies that transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another High Court has to be for a certain period and during the period for which the Transferee Judge serves as a Judge of a High Court to which he is transferred, he shall be entitled to a monthly allowance of Rs.10,000/-, in addition to his salary — Article 195 provides that office of a Judge of the High Court shall fall vacant on his attaining the age of sixty-two years or when he resigns or is removed from office in accordance with the Constitution — This Article or any other Article of the Constitution does not envisage that the office of a Judge of the High Court shall fall vacant on his transfer to another High Court under clause (1) of Article 200 — When clause (1) and clause (2) of Article 200 are read with clause 25 of the President’s Order No. 3 of 1997 and Article 195 of the Constitution, it transpires that transfer of a Judge of High Court from one High Court to another High Court by the President, in exercise of his discretion under clause (1) of Article 200 of the Constitution, cannot be permanent and it has to be temporary i.e. for a period/term. [P³, Q³, S³, T³, U³ & V³]

(w²) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Arts. 200 & 175A — Transfer of High Court judges — Transfer with malicious intent — Scope — The impugned transfer of three Judges from the Lahore High Court, Sindh High Court and Balochistan High Court to the Islamabad High Court is constitutionally unsustainable, as the entire process suffers from malice in fact as well as malice in law — Summary initiated by Ministry of law and Justice demonstrates that the process was not initiated at the instance or on the instructions of the President, as required under Article 200(1) of the Constitution, but was instead unilaterally initiated — The record is silent as to upon whose instructions the ministry initiated the summary — The summary sought authorization only for the proposed transfer of two Judges from LHC and SHC, whereas the transfer of Muhammad Asif, Additional Judge of the Balochistan High Court, was effected without initiation of any summary — The justification advanced in the summary on the basis of “regional diversity” is founded on demonstrably incorrect factual premises, including an unconstitutional bifurcation of areas of provinces into “urban” and “rural” categories and an erroneous portrayal of provincial representation in the Islamabad High Court — The object of provincial representation could lawfully have been achieved through appointments made by the Judicial Commission of Pakistan under Article 175A, rather than by resorting to transfers under Article 200(1) — The minutes of the Judicial Commission a meeting further establish that despite the availability of eligible nominees and five vacant posts, only two appointments were made, and the remaining vacancies were deliberately left unfilled, evidencing a pre-designed scheme to subsequently fill those vacancies through transfers, thereby circumventing the constitutional mechanism of appointment — Moreover, the mandatory consultation contemplated by Article 200(1) was neither effective nor meaningful, as the nature of the transfer, its permanency, consequences for seniority, and the requirement of fresh oath were never disclosed or deliberated upon with the Chief Justice of Pakistan or the Chief Justices of the concerned High Courts — The unilateral insertion of a decisive determination regarding oath and seniority by the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice in a subsequent summary, without lawful authority, further vitiates the process — The absence of any objective criteria for selection of the transferee Judges, coupled with the unexplained bypassing of numerous senior Judges in the respective High Courts, establishes malice — Accordingly, the cumulative effect of these defects leads to the inescapable conclusion that the impugned transfers were effected through malice in fact as well as malice in law, and thus cannot be sustained under the Constitution. [E³, F³, G³, H³, I³, J³, K³, L³, M³, N³ & O³]

(x²) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Transfer of High Court judges — Transfer with malicious intent — Scope — The process for transfer of three particular Judges to Islamabad High Court was initiated and completed by Ministry of Law and Justice with unnecessary haste not in the public interest but, prima facie, with the motive to deprive the then Senior Puisne Judge of Islamabad High Court of his consideration/appointment as Chief Justice Islamabad High Court and to take over control of the affairs of Islamabad High Court and District Judiciary of Islamabad Capital Territory from the sitting Judges of Islamabad High Court and to hand over the same to the Transferee Judges and Additional Judges in supervision of Sardar Muhammad Sarfraz Dogar, J. as Senior Puisne Judge Islamabad High Court and thereafter as Acting Chief Justice Islamabad High Court and Chief Justice Islamabad High Court — All the events subsequent to issuance of the impugned notification in the Islamabad High Court have proved the same. [C³]

(y²) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 184 — Constitutional jurisdiction — Judicial review — Scope — The task of interpreting the provisions of the Constitution is entrusted to the judiciary — Interpretation of the Constitution is the prerogative and duty of the superior courts as envisaged in the Constitution — Moreover, judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution — The judiciary is vested with the power to test the validity of an action of every authority functioning under the Constitution — It is the duty of the judiciary to determine the legality of the executive action so that the rights of the people are guarded against arbitrary violations by the executive. [B³]

Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 324, Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2009 SC 879, A. K. Kaul v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 1403, Raja Ram Pal v. Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) SCC 184, I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2007 SC 8, District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2015 SC 401) relied.

(z²) Mala fide —

— In the legal context an action actuated with an ulterior purpose is malicious or malice in facts — Where an action taken is so unreasonable, improbable or blatantly illegal that it ceases to be an action countenanced or contemplated by the law under which it is purportedly taken, malice will be implied and the act would be deemed to suffer from malice in law. [D³]

PLD 2021 SC 1, 2017 SCMR 1249, PLD 1974 SC 151, PLD 1969 SC 14, PLD 1968 SC 313, PLD 1965 SC 671, AIR 203 SC 1941 referred.

(a³) Interpretation of statues —

— Harmonious construction — Scope — Doctrine of harmonious construction is a principle of statutory interpretation used by the courts to resolve conflicts between two or more laws or provisions, requiring them to be read in a way that gives effect to both, rather than one nullify the other — The goal is to find an interpretation where all provisions can co-exist and work together, avoiding a repugnant outcome by making efforts to reconcile any inconsistencies — The provisions of a statute or law should be considered in their entirety to understand their true meaning and relationship — The interpretation should aim to reconcile the provisions, finding a way for them to work together harmoniously — The main aim of this doctrine is to give effect to all the provisions while maintaining the overall coherence and purpose of law — According to doctrine a provision of a statute should not be interpreted or construed in isolation but as a whole, so as to remove any conflict or inconsistency. [Para No. 91 of Minority View]

Hamza Rashid Khan v. Election Appellate Tribunal PLD 2024 SC 1028, Kamaluddin Qureshi v. Ali International Co. 2009 CLD 784 (Supreme Court of Pakistan), Accountant General, Sindh v. Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi PLD 2008 SC 522, Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise (Enforcement) v. Messers MEGA TECH (PVT.) LTD. 2005 SCMR 1166, Collector of Customs Karachi v. Messrs NEW ELECTRONICS (PVT.) PLD 1994 SC 363, Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 324, Zahoor Textile Mills v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1999 SC 880, Salahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd. PLD 1975 SC 244, Shahid Nabi Malik v. Chief Election Commissioner PLD 1997 SC 32, M. Pentiah v. Veeramallappa AIR 1961 SC 1107, Union of India v. Sankalchand, AIR 1977 SC 2328, Padma Ben Banushali and Ors. v. Yogendra Rathore and Ors. AIR 2006 SC 2167, British Airways PLC v. Union of India AIR 2002 SC 391 relied.

(b³) Administration of justice —

— If a case can be decided on other or narrower grounds, the court will abstain from deciding the constitutional question — The court will not decide a larger constitutional question than is necessary for the determination of the case. [W³]

Lahore Development Authority v. Imrana Tiwana (2015 SCMR 1739) referred.

(c³) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 5 — Loyalty to state and obedience to constitution and law — Scope — The rule of law and strict adherence to the Constitution by all the organs of the State and the institutions attached therewith is the key to prosperity of Pakistan and promotion of national interest — Further, the executive orders must be within the scope of the Constitution and same should not be arbitrary and capricious — Short term gains achieved by violating the Constitution will always undermine the nation’s long term interests in stability, legitimacy and the rule of law. [X³]

Additional Dissenting Note — Per Shakeel Ahmad, J

(d³) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Transfer of High Court judges — Temporary transfer — Scope — A plain reading of Article 200 (1) of the Constitution reveals that while the President is empowered to transfer a judge from one High Court to another, such a transfer is conditional upon two critical safeguards: (i) the consent of the judge concerned and (ii) mandatory consultation with the CJP and the Chief Justices of the respective High Courts — These requirements can in no way be interpreted as mere formalities rather, they are bulwarks present to preserve judicial independence and institutional integrity — It is significant to further note that Article 200 of the Constitution itself does not prescribe any duration for such a transfer — However, this silence does not imply permanence. Rather, the cumulative effect of the concerned judge’s consent and the consultative process points towards a temporary and mutually agreed arrangement — This interpretation finds further support in clause (2) of Article 200 of the Constitution, which was substituted by the President’s Order No. 14 of 1985 — According to the said clause, the period during which a judge serves at the transferee High Court or holds any other designated office, he shall be entitled to such allowances and privileges as the President may determine — It is this very juncture at which multiple interpretations have been put forth to us — However, the employment of the phrase “during the period”, which remained unchanged throughout all Constitutional amendments, highlights a time-bound framework, suggesting that the transfer bears no permanence, even in the absence of a maximum duration — Clause 3 of Article 200 of the Constitution, which was introduced through the Constitution (First Amendment) in 1974, allows the Chief Justice of a High Court to temporarily increase the number of judges by requiring a judge from another High Court to attend its sittings — During this period, the judge exercises the same powers as a regular judge of that High Court — The explanation added by President’s Order No. 14 of 1985 clarifies that the term “High Court” also includes its Benches. [H⁴ & I⁴]

(e³) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Transfer of High Court judges — Scope — The initiation of the proposal for the transfer of a judge of a High Court must originate from the President alone — This requirement assumes greater significance in cases like the present one, as Article 200 of the Constitution then expressly mandates consultation with the CJP and the Chief Justices of both the transferee and receiving Courts — The CJP and the Chief Justices of the High Courts owe a duty both to the President and the judges concerned — Thus, if they consider it necessary to examine any further material facts, they are well within their rights to seek clarification from the President — In its truest essence, what Article 200 of the Constitution demands is consultation, not concurrence with the CJP and Chief Justices of the High Courts, enabling the President to arrive at an independent decision, but normally, the opinion of the CJP and Chief Justices of the concerned High Courts should be accepted by the President — However, the term “consultation” under Article 200 of the Constitution must be understood to mean an exercise that is effective, meaningful, purposive, and aimed at consensus — It must not be reduced to a mere formality or exposed to any arbitrariness — In the present matter, this essential requirement is found wanting due to the concealment of material facts, particularly those concerning seniority and the issue of fresh oath in the summary moved to the CJP and Chief Justices of the concerned High Courts — This Court has emphasized that the power to transfer cannot be invoked by the President or the Executive for any purpose other than that of the public interest, in the course of which consultation still remains mandatory — It is therefore imperative that, during such consultation, all relevant facts and data are placed before the CJP and Chief Justices of the concerned High Courts by the President or the Executive — Only then can they offer the benefit of their informed and objective opinions to the President — If necessary facts are withheld, the constitutional purpose of consultation is frustrated, and the process stands vitiated — Therefore, the President bears a constitutional obligation to disclose all material facts necessary to facilitate an informed, fair, and meaningful consultation — The failure to do so, as evident in the instant matter, amounts to a violation of Article 200 (1) of the Constitution — As such, it can be safely concluded that effective and meaningful consultation with the CJP and the relevant Chief Justices did not take place, thereby rendering the impugned notification a nullity in the eyes of law. [J⁴]

Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324) relied.

(f³) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Transfer of High Court judges — Such discretion is not unstructured — Scope — The facts and circumstances of the present matter strongly suggest that the impugned transfer was driven by oblique considerations rather than any legitimate public interest — Thus, the power vested in the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, to transfer a judge of a High Court under Article 200 of the Constitution is not an unfettered discretion — It is a solemn responsibility to be exercised only when the circumstances reasonably warrant such an action in the public interest — The authority is not to be wielded for reasons of convenience, administrative strategy, or to cloak disciplinary motives in the garb of routine administrative action — No robe shall be shifted under shadow or suspicion — Where the cause is just and reasonable, such as importing judicial or better talent, deploying expertise in a specialised branch of law, not locally available, guarding impartiality from local entanglements, balancing judicial strength across the provinces, or furthering the ideal of national cohesion, a transfer may be contemplated — But even then, the flame of public interest must burn clearly, for it lights the path under Article 200 of the Constitution — The transfer under Article 200 of the Constitution must not be seen as punitive in nature, nor should it be viewed as undermining the independence of the Judiciary — The transfer of a judge, when made in accordance with law, is a recognised aspect of judicial service and does not in itself carry any adverse implication — However, given the exceptional nature of this power, its exercise must be aided by clear reasons, procedural transparency, and adherence to the constitutional requirements as set forth in Article 200 of the Constitution — The onus lies squarely on the State to justify that the conditions laid down therein had been duly satisfied. [K⁴]

Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324) relied.

(g³) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Arts. 200 & 175A — Islamabad High Court Act (XVII of 2010), S. 3 — Judicial Commission of Pakistan (Appointment of Judges) Rules, 2024, R. 6 — Permanent transfer from one High Court to another — Permissibility — Scope — A combined reading of Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 200 of the Constitution makes it evident that a judge cannot be transferred permanently from one High Court to another — Under Section 3 of the Islamabad High Court Act, 2010, the permanent strength of the IHC is prescribed — The object of proportionate representation of all the Provinces in the IHC in terms of the Act could have easily been achieved by making fresh appointments of the judges from the Provinces by the JCP by invoking provisions of Article 175-A of the Constitution as Rule 6 of the JCP (Appointment of Judges), Rules, 2024 makes it obligatory upon the members of the JCP to ensure proper diversity in terms of region as well as gender and religion, subject to fulfilment of laid down criteria — Even if it is argued that a transfer is required in the interest of national integration, it must not come at the expense of judicial independence, which is a core constitutional value and a matter of the highest public interest — Where a conflict arises between these two considerations, the principle of judicial independence must prevail over the amorphous consideration of national integration — The judicial role is fundamentally different from ordinary public service — A judge does not serve under the government in the traditional sense — There is no master-servant relationship — Judges are not bound to follow Executive directives in deciding cases, and even superior courts generally only correct judges of subordinate courts through judgments and not by issuing commands — In this context, the meaning of “transfer” under Article 200 of the Constitution must be distinguished from how transfers are understood in general civil service — It must be interpreted in harmony with other constitutional provisions, particularly those designed to safeguard judicial independence — A permanent transfer from one High Court to another, if made ignoring the provisions of Article 175A of the Constitution, which provides a complete procedure for the appointment of permanent judges of the High Court, would render Article 175A of the Constitution redundant — This has never been the intention of the drafters of our Constitution or the Legislature — To permit such a practice is to place in the hands of the Executive a lever by which any judge who resists its pull, or falls from its grace, may be displaced, a prospect that strikes at the very heart of judicial independence. [L⁴]

(h³) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Arts. 200, 2-A, 175, 178, 195 & Third Schedule — Permanent transfer from one High Court to another — Impact — Disruption of seniority — Consequences — Structural threat to judicial independence — Scope — The Constitution envisions the Judiciary as the sentinel of citizens’ rights and liberties, an institution immune from Executive influence and interference — To give this vision concrete form, the Legislature has embedded within the constitutional framework several provisions to secure and safeguard judicial independence — Article 2-A and 175 of the Constitution affirm this principle, while the oath required under Articles 178 and 195 of the Constitution read with the Third Schedule, administered to every Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and judges, and Chief Justice and judges of High Courts, binds them to discharge their duties “without fear or favour, affection or ill-will” — This reinforces the legislative intent to achieve an impartial Judiciary — Yet these words risk becoming hollow if the Executive retains the power to reward or injure a judge through permanent transfer — The permanent transfer of a judge from one High Court to another, particularly when it disrupts established seniority in the transferee court, amounts not only to a personal injury to the judges of such court but also a structural threat to judicial independence — Each High Court in Pakistan is constitutionally distinct and independent of another, headed by its own Chief Justice and governed by its own seniority list — To conflate them, or allow one to override the other, is to blur these foundational distinctions — This, too, reinforces that any transfer under Article 200 of the Constitution is not meant to be permanent, for permanence in this context would subvert both structure and spirit. [M⁴]

(i³) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Permanent transfer of High Court judges — Grounds unrelated to public interest — Omission of facts regarding fresh oath and seniority — Process completed unusually quickly — Mala fide intent — Manipulation of seniority and Administrative Committee — Scope — Petitioners assailed the transfer of High Court judges to Islamabad High Court on permanent basis — Validity — Although the transferee judges were transferred to the IHC with their consent, they were initiated by the Executive/Ministry of Law and Justice on grounds unrelated to any discernible public interest, that too without disclosing the necessary facts, i.e., issues of fresh oath and seniority of the transferee judges — A perusal of the summary moved by the Ministry of Law and Justice, seeking the transfer of judges from Lahore and Sindh High Courts to IHC, reveals that the entire process was completed in an unusually short span of five days — The speed of these actions, coupled with the absence of essential information, does raise significant concerns — Notably, the summary failed to address the implications of seniority and the requirement of a fresh oath for the transferee judges — This omission suggests that complete and accurate information was not placed before the CJP, the Chief Justices of the respective High Courts, or even the transferee judges themselves — Such concealment points toward a mala fide intent, possibly to marginalise the senior-most judges of the IHC, influence its institutional composition, or manipulate the process of appointing its Chief Justice — This transfer had a direct bearing on the seniority list and the composition of the IHC’s Administrative Committee, both central in upholding judicial integrity — The deliberate withholding of information relating to seniority and oath-taking requirements amounts to a violation of the rule of fairness and undermines the principles of transparency and judicial independence. [N⁴]

(j³) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Permanent transfer to Islamabad High Court — Manner of execution — Mala fide exercise of authority — Undue interference — Dilution of independence — Selective transfers — Ulterior motives — Lack of transparency in consultation — Scope — The manner in which the transfers were carried out reflects a mala fide exercise of authority, one seemingly intended to dilute the independence of the IHC and reshape its composition — Crucial aspects, such as the implications for seniority and the requirement of a fresh oath, were not transparently presented to the CJP and concerned Chief Justices of the High Courts during the consultation process — Furthermore, the selection of the judges for the transfer itself raises legitimate concerns — Justice Sardar Muhammad Sarfraz Dogar ranked 15th in the seniority list of the Lahore High Court; Justice Khadim Hussain Soomro stood 20th in the High Court of Sindh; and Justice Muhammad Asif was serving as an additional judge in the High Court of Balochistan — Yet, there is no material on record to depict whether senior judges of these courts were offered a transfer to the IHC, or whether they declined or withheld consent, and that only after this exercise, the transferee judges were so selected for transfer — Lack of this exercise clearly suggests that the impugned transfers are selective transfers, made with ulterior motive and mala fide intentions — In one instance, the summary proposing Justice Soomro’s transfer cited the need for “representation from Rural Sindh”, a rationale rightly objected to by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Sindh, as such a ground for transfer is wholly alien to the Constitution — Further, it is observed with great pain that vide a letter the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, not only forwarded the completed summary to the Prime Minister but on his own accord and unilaterally opined on the seniority and oath status of the transferee judges, a matter clearly beyond his remit — When the learned Attorney General was asked to explain whether there was any hindrance to fill permanent vacancy(ies) of judge(s) in the IHC by adopting the procedure incorporated in Article 175-A of the Constitution read with Section 3 of the Act of 2010, he remained answerless — Taken together, these events reveal a troubling pattern of rushed decision-making, selective disclosure, and undue interference — The process, stripped of transparency and fairness, appears to have served an ulterior purpose, one that compromised the independence and internal balance of the IHC. [P⁴]

Doody v. Secretary State for Home Department (1993) 3 All ER R 92, 106 relied.

(k³) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Arts. 184 & 200 — Constitutional jurisdiction — Locus Standi / Public Interest Litigation — Petitions by advocates and representatives of legal community — Right and obligation to uphold democracy, rule of law, and independence of Judiciary — Public injury distinct from private injury — Maintainability of petitions by non-aggrieved judges — Scope — Petitioners assailed the notification issued by President of Pakistan in exercise of powers conferred under Article 200 for transfer of certain judges from provincial High Courts to Islamabad High Court on permanent basis — Respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petitions filed by the parties other than the aggrieved judges — Validity — The petitioners, other than the aggrieved judges, with the exception of one petition filed by the leader of a political party, are practising advocates and representatives of the legal community — In that capacity, they both are entitled and obligated to uphold democracy, the rule of law, and the independence of the Judiciary — They are also responsible for ensuring that the three organs of the State, namely the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary, do not act in contravention of their constitutional or statutory duties, or neglect to perform such duties in a way that causes harm to the public interest — Such harm, referred to as public injury, is distinct from private injury — It is now well settled that every citizen of Pakistan has the right to an independent Judiciary tasked with dispensing justice in accordance with the injunctions of the Qur’an and Sunnah — This right is a fundamental one, as reflected in Articles 2A, 175, 176, 177, 192, and 199 of the Constitution, read together with Article 10 of the Charter of the United Nations, to which Pakistan is a signatory — The independence of the Judiciary is closely tied to the process by which judges are appointed and transferred from one High Court to another — If such appointments and transfers are carried out in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution or lacking public interest, it undermines judicial independence and inevitably erodes public confidence in the judicial system. [Y³]

(l³) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 184 — Public Interest Litigation / Locus Standi — Rule of law — Every organ of the State to act within constitutional and legal limits — Obligation to discharge duties — Acts or omissions affecting public interest — Absence of specific legal injury to individual or determinate group — Right to challenge unlawful conduct — Compel performance of public duties — Prevention of impunity by public authorities — Safeguarding judicial independence — Scope — It is fundamental to the maintenance of the rule of law that every organ of the State must operate within the limits prescribed by the Constitution or law and must discharge the duties imposed upon it — Where no specific legal injury is caused to an individual or a determinate class or group, but public interest is adversely affected by an act or omission of the State or a public authority, an important question comes to the surface: who is entitled to bring an action to vindicate the rule of law, to challenge such an unlawful conduct, or to compel the performance of a public duty? — If no person were permitted to seek redress in cases of public wrong or injury to collective interests, it would severely undermine the rule of law and judicial independence — Such a situation would allow public authorities to act with impunity, beyond their lawful authority or in disregard of their constitutional duties and obligations. [Z³]

Locus Standi and Judicial Review by S.M Thio. relied

(m³) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 184 — Constitutional jurisdiction — Locus Standi / Public Interest Litigation — Strict requirements of locus standi relaxed in matters of public interest affecting constitutional norms — Supreme Court adopts liberal approach — Distinction from cases protecting individual rights — Focus on broader objective of upholding Constitution — Scope — The fundamental rights, which are enshrined in our Constitution and also have the backing of our religion, Islam, will become meaningless if there is no independent and impartial Judiciary available in the country — The independence of Judiciary is inextricably linked and connected with the constitutional process of transferring judges from one High Court to another — Therefore, the strict requirements of locus standi in cases where public interest is at stake and constitutional norms are allegedly compromised become less important and must yield to the broader objective of upholding the Constitution — In contrast, when the primary purpose of the judicial process is to safeguard individual rights, its focus on the legality of administrative actions is confined to instances where those rights are directly violated — Furthermore, Supreme Court has consistently adopted a liberal approach to locus standi in matters involving public interest and fundamental rights. [Para No. 7]

Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324), Multilines Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee (PLD 1995 SC 423), Wukla Mahaz Barai Tahafuz Dastoor v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 1263), Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416) relied.

(n³) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Arts. 184 & 200 — Constitutional jurisdiction — Transfer of High Court judges — Scope — The petitioners, including practicing lawyers, advocates, and the founder of a political party, have the requisite locus standi to maintain the petitions under Article 184 of the Constitution, irrespective of the fact that the aggrieved judges have filed a separate petition — The matters raised involve questions of substantial public importance concerning the functioning of the Judiciary as an independent organ of the State and the preservation of its institutional integrity — In such cases, where public interest and constitutional norms are at stake, the Supreme Court adopts a liberal approach to standing, recognizing the right of concerned citizens and representatives of the legal community to seek redress and vindicate the rule of law. [C⁴]

(o³) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 9 — Security of person — Access to justice — Scope — A plain reading of Article 9 of the Constitution reveals that it guarantees that the citizens shall not be deprived of life or liberty except in accordance with law — The right of access to justice is inherently encompassed within this protection. [B⁴]

Sharaf Afridi v. the Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PLD 1989 Karachi 404) and Govt. of Balochistan v. Aziz Ullah Memon (PLD 1993 SC 341) relied.

(p³) Constitution of Pakistan —

— Art. 200 — Permanent transfer from one High Court to another against permanent vacancies — Serious constitutional concern — Impact on judicial independence — Safeguards against Executive influence — Scope — The permanent transfer of judges from one High Court to another, against permanent vacancies, is a matter of serious constitutional concern — It is the Judiciary which is vested with the critical responsibility of ensuring that every organ of the State operates within the bounds of law, thereby upholding and giving practical effect to the rule of law — To fulfil this role, the Judiciary must be insulated from any form of Executive pressure or influence — The framers of the Constitution have recognised this necessity and have, therefore, embedded within the constitutional framework elaborate safeguards to protect judicial independence — It is of utmost importance to remind ourselves that the concept of independence is not confined merely to freedom from Executive interference — It is a far more comprehensive, encompassing immunity from all forms of pressure, whether political, economic, social, or ideological — It also includes freedom from biases that may arise from the background, class, or other such affiliations that the judges themselves may have — The independence of the Judiciary stands as the cornerstone of our constitutional order — It must be a body well-structured, resolute, and responsive while being equipped to swiftly address public grievances and to dispense justice with courage, clarity, and unwavering impartiality — An efficient and impartial Judiciary nurtures a legal environment where peace prevails, rights are safeguarded, and justice knows no bias of caste, creed, colour, culture, or gender — Such an environment not only upholds the dignity of individuals and groups but also lays down the foundation for sustained economic progress and social development. [D⁴]

Zafar Ali Shah v. Pervez Musharraf (PLD 2000 SC 869) relied.

(q³) Holy Quran —

— Surah 4 Ayat 135, Surah 5 Ayat 8 & 44 — Justice should be rendered regardless of the status of the parties. [E⁴]

(r³) Holy Quran —

— Surah 4 Ayat 105 — Allah the Almighty has ordained us not to advocate for the deceitful. [F⁴]

(s³) Holy Quran —

— Surah 38 Ayat 26 — Allah the Almighty instructs those in the position of authority to judge without being swayed by personal desires. [G⁴]

(t³) Administration of justice —

— Duty of judge — Scope — Judges must be tempered from resilient will and unwavering integrity, for upon their shoulders rests the duty of upholding the rule of law, an unbending doctrine under which no one, however exalted, stands above the law. This principle is not merely symbolic; rather, this lies at the heart of judicial independence, which sustains participatory democracy, preserves the rule of law as an evolving ideal, and ensures that justice reaches those most in need of it — In interpreting the Constitution in its true spirit, a duty woven into the very fabric of our judicial robes, we must remain anchored to the principle of judicial independence. [H⁴]

(u³) Public functionaries —

— Public authorities, in the discharge of their official duties, are bound to act fairly and justly. [O⁴]

Messers Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager Quaid-e-Azam International Airport, Karachi & others (1998 SCMR 2268) and Ikram Bus Service and others v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan & others (PLD 1963 SC 564) referred.

ORDER OF THE COURT SIGNED & ANNOUNCED BY THE CONSTITUTION BENCH ON 19.6.2025

By majority of 3 to 2 (comprising Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Justice Shahid Bilal Hassan, and Justice Salahuddin Panhwar), all the Constitution Petitions are disposed of along with Misc. Applications in terms of the Short Order dated 19.06.2025. Whereas, Justice Naeem Akhter Afghan and Justice Shakeel Ahmad, vide their own short order dated 19.06.2025 allowed the Constitution Petitions and set aside the impugned Notification No.F.10(2)/2024-A.II, dated 01.02 2025.